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 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the major influences on the Pakistan-United 
States relationship in an effort to identify patterns that could help future policymakers.  The 
factors that most affected the relationship were: crises in Afghanistan, American aid and arms 
sales to Pakistan, India, nuclear proliferation, and Pakistan’s historic struggle between its 
military establishment and democratic institutions.  The Pakistan-United States relationship has 
been characterized by periods of amity as well as mutual distrust.  Immediately before the first 
Afghan crisis in 1979, the Pakistan-United States relationship suffered from Pakistan’s 
withdrawal from CENTO, arms embargos, and a marked discord between the two governments.  
The peak of the relationship occurred in 1986.  In 1986, Pakistan accepted a generous six-year 
aid program from the United States, the relationship between the heads-of-state was friendly, and 
the Russian troops in Afghanistan were taking heavy losses.  This thesis analyzes the deciding 
factors in the Pakistan-United States relationship since Pakistan’s creation while focusing on the 
periods of crisis in Afghanistan.  
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Introduction 
During the Cold War, American policymakers continuously sought countries to join the 
effort of the “Free World” to “contain” the expansion of communism.  The Cold War began with 
conflicts such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, in which American soldiers fought side-by-side 
with East Asian soldiers.  By the 1980s, the United States embarked upon a completely different 
type of proxy war in Southwest Asia.  In this historically volatile region, a relationship 
developed between Pakistan and the United States.  The countries’ relationship prior to 1979 can 
be described as unsteady and incongruous, but this began to change on December 24 as Russian 
tanks and troops rolled across the northern border of neighboring Afghanistan.  
 American policy against the expansion of communism escalated from containment to 
“rollback” under Ronald Reagan.  The United States solidified its Cold War connection to 
Pakistan in an effort to expel communism from Afghanistan.  Not only did the United States and 
Pakistan have to work together on the Afghanistan issue, they also had to overcome many 
barriers to their relationship.  The Carter and Reagan administrations negotiated differently with 
Pakistan, which in turn produced strikingly different results.  In terms of creating a firm 
partnership, the Reagan administration was much more successful in building a relationship that 
peaked in 1986.  Yet, by the end of Reagan’s second term, following President Zia al-Huq’s 
death, and the end of the Afghan crisis, the partnership was rapidly weakening.  Nevertheless, 
the United States worked with Pakistan throughout the Afghan crisis and a relationship formed 
that outlasted the Cold War and became unnatural and not easily broken.  Although the United 
States and Pakistan “won” by expelling the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, they also “lost” their 
object of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, which would later come back to haunt them.    
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Pakistan and the United States quickly developed new security strategies to face the 
growing threat from Afghanistan in both 1979 and 2001.  This thesis will examine the common-
ground relationships that developed between the “Leader of the Free World” and an occasionally 
democracy-deprived Pakistan due to their mutual goals.  Major geopolitical risks from Pakistan’s 
neighbors, most notably India, increased tension in the region and led to an arms race in which 
the United States was forced to choose a side.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the 
deciding factor for Presidents Carter and Reagan to renew a strong and mutually beneficial 
bilateral relationship with Pakistan.  These two presidents’ relationship with Pakistan’s leader of 
the time, Zia al-Haq, demonstrated several recurring patterns in the partnership, such as 
reciprocal distrust and wariness and mutual cooperation and shared goals.  Although the decade 
from 1980-1990 proved largely successful in draining the Soviet Union of resources and 
eventually played a difficult to quantify role in the collapse of the country, the partnership 
between the United States and Pakistan deteriorated and never returned to its former strength.  
Rather, in the past twenty years, Pakistan has continuously oscillated between ally and 
uncomfortable acquaintance of the United States.  Since the end of the Cold War, the issue of 
Pakistan’s right to develop and maintain nuclear weapons reemerged and constituted a chaffing 
point in American policy toward Pakistan.   
The major issues that affected the Pakistan-United States relationship since the 1950s 
compounded this problem.  American aid to Pakistan and the arms sales relationship has not 
been ideal for either Pakistan or the United States.  Pakistani officials have repeatedly 
emphasized their desire for a stable arms sales relationship.  Yet, the United States has enforced 
a reactive policy of attaching aid to other requirements, such as nuclear nonproliferation or the 
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preservation of democratic institutions.  This policy has backfired, illustrated by Pakistan’s 
successful nuclear program and its unstable, and at times nonexistent, civilian government.  The 
India factor also contributed to a sense of disillusionment with American foreign policy in 
Pakistan.  Americans have been frustrated with the persistent conflict in Kashmir.  Despite the 
reemergence of these harmful factors after the first Afghan crisis, after 11 September 2001 
Pakistan and the United States once again formed a partnership for another conflict in 
Afghanistan.  While the goals of the two nations were similar and the relationship seemed to 
strengthen, eventually, as before, the mutual ambitions of Pakistan and the United States 
diverged.  As of 2012, the relationship can once again be described as unsteady and incongruous. 
The nations of the Middle East and Southwest Asia deserve attention for many reasons.  
Not only does the United States military maintain a strong presence in the region, but the United 
States also has deep commercial, geopolitical, and historic connections there.  Because it is 
impossible to generalize the unique relationships the United States has with each country, 
relationships with each nation in the region should be continuously analyzed and understood in 
terms of its connection with the United States and the overall role it plays in the greater area.  
Pakistan, and subsequently its interconnected history with its neighbors, Afghanistan and India, 
requires consideration now more than ever due to its ever-changing and precarious relationship 
with the United States. 
The historical events that took place in the period since World War II are extremely 
important to understand.  The United States developed clear anticommunist policies, but since 
the collapse of communism, the policies have not always been as clear.  The threat of terrorism 
has replaced the threat from communism and the United States has been forced to create a new 
set of cogent policies that fit into a new post-9/11 paradigm.  One broad policy will not work in 
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the many countries from Northern Africa to Southwest Asia.  Each country needs its own 
contingency policy; no longer is a single set of guidelines such as the Carter or Reagan Doctrines 
realistic.  To determine the best route of action for the United States, researchers must at all 
times be aware of the history of a particular country and the effect it has had upon its relationship 
with the United States while also paying careful attention to current issues and developments 
regionally and globally.  Several questions regarding the United States-Pakistan relationship 
have become ubiquitous: How did the relationship begin?  Why does the United States still 
financially support Pakistan?  Does the United States need Pakistan?  Why is the relationship so 
fluid?  Can it be salvaged?  What does the future hold?  These questions are extremely important 
and can only be answered after a thorough examination of the recent past.   
  
 
 
Chapter 1: The Formation of the Pakistan-United States Relationship 
Since the entrance of Pakistan onto the world stage, the country’s history has been 
determined by its geopolitics.  Pakistan’s relationships with its neighbors have had significant 
and lasting effects on Pakistan’s foreign policy.  Pakistan suffered from regional instability vis-à-
vis its greatest enemy: India.  Because of border disputes and ethnic rivalries, Afghanistan 
constituted another security threat to Pakistan.  Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union 
increased Pakistan’s potential to be drawn into a Cold War conflict as a proxy, as would happen 
in 1979.  Its position on the border between the Middle East and South Asia gave it the potential 
to be a geostrategic asset to the United States.  
But the United States did not immediately move toward an alliance with Pakistan; and 
between 1947 and 1979, the two nations’ relationship experienced times of warm friendship and 
distant acquaintance.  Arms transfers were the best indicator of the closeness between Pakistan 
and the United States.  During times of arms sales, interactions between Pakistan and the United 
States were friendly; but during arms embargos and restrictions, the relationship was precarious.  
The different perceptions of threats often led to divergent goals between the United States and 
Pakistan.  During the Cold War, the United States was intensely focused on countering 
communism on a global scale while Pakistan was mostly preoccupied with the security threat 
from India.  The India factor caused the greatest strain to the Pakistan-United States relationship.  
By the 1970s, nuclear proliferation constituted another barrier to a strong alliance.   
After World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower with global 
responsibilities.  The United States was constantly seeking new allies around the world because 
of competition with the Soviet Union.  In a memorandum to President Harry Truman, Secretary 
of State George Marshall called the president’s attention to the potential value of Pakistan as the
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 largest Muslim country in the world and a country with a strategic position in South Asia.
1
  Yet, 
the United States was initially hesitant to make a commitment to Pakistan.  Pakistan asked the 
United States for two billion dollars of assistance over five years for “primarily defence, and 
secondly, economic development.”2  The United States replied that it did not have adequate 
resources to meet that request, but did offer a smaller amount of aid for humanitarian purposes. 
The State Department did not want to assume “virtual US military responsibility” for Pakistan.3  
Tensions in the disputed region of Kashmir further contributed to American caution of aligning 
itself with Pakistan.   
The territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir erupted in 1947.  The 
United States wished to remain neutral, and in a note to Pakistan and India, the United States 
claimed it was a “firm friend” of both countries, urging the two countries to work together to 
solve the dispute.
4
   The United States wanted the issue to be addressed through bilateral 
negotiations between Pakistan and India, but the United States also acknowledged that the 
problem was unlikely to be resolved without outside assistance.
5
  The United Nations assumed 
the role of arbiter and, on 13 August 1948, the United Nations Commission for Pakistan and 
India (UNCIP) declared a cease-fire.
6
  By 1950, tensions in Kashmir remained unresolved and 
demilitarization had not occurred as ordered by the UNCIP resolution.  American State 
Department officials wrote: “Both India and Pakistan have proved difficult and recalcitrant and 
                                                 
1
 “1 Memorandum of Secretary of State George C. Marshall to President Harry S. Truman, 17 July 1947 
(Extracts),” K. Arif, ed., in America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1 (Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1984), 3. 
2
 “6 Memorandum of the Government of Pakistan to US State Department on its requirement of financial 
and military assistance, October 1947 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 5.  
3
 “12 Draft of a report on ‘Need for SANACC [State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee] 
Appraisal of Possible United States Military Interests in South Asian Region,’ prepared in the Office of Near 
Eastern Affair (NEA), and submitted to Loy W. Henderson, Chairman, SANAACC Subcommittee for NEA, 19 May 
1948 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 11.  
4
 “3 US Note to India and Pakistan, 31 December 1947,” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 5.  
5
 “3 US Note to India and Pakistan, 31 December 1947,” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 5.  
6
 “18 UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 19.   
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both are far from blameless in the matter.”7  The United States acted though the United Nations 
and attempted neutrality in the late 1940s, but as fighting waxed and waned between India and 
Pakistan throughout the following decades, the United States became embroiled in the conflict.   
From 1948-1950, the United States policy toward Pakistan remained ambiguous.  The 
American position on assistance relied on the British to have the “paramount responsibility of the 
maintenance of international peace and security in South Asia.”8  Although Pakistan desperately 
wanted arms assistance from the United States, the Truman Administration gave priority to 
Western Europe.
9
  Gradually, however, the United States began to acknowledge the possibility 
that Pakistan could be a Cold War asset to the United States.  In 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recognized that Karachi and Lahore could be of “strategic importance” if the United States 
needed a base of operations against the Soviet Union or a launching point for recapture of crucial 
oil areas in the Middle East.
10
  The ambiguous nature of the early Pakistan-United States 
relationship was exemplified during 1950.   
The United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, ushering 
in an important precedent of American military sales to Pakistan.
11
   But, in a State Department 
“Country Statement,” Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee wrote that the small amounts 
                                                 
7
 “53  Resolution submitted by Cuba, Norway, UK and US in the UN Security Council on 24 February 
1950 (adopted by the Council on 14 March 1950) (Extracts),” K. Arif, ed., in America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 
51.  
8
 “12 Draft of a report on ‘Need for SANACC [State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee] 
Appraisal of Possible United States Military Interests in South Asian Region,’ prepared in the Office of Near 
Eastern Affair (NEA), and submitted to Loy W. Henderson, Chairman, SANAACC Subcommittee for NEA, 19 May 
1948 (Extracts),”  America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 10. 
9
 “21 Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Embassy in India, 31 Marsh 1949,” America-
Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 17. 
10
 “Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 March 1949 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 
1, 15.  
11
 “50 US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement effected by exchange of notes on 29 November 
and 15 December 1950 (entered into force on 15 December 1950) (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 
43. 
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of military aid to Pakistan were only “psychological” and merely “token assistance.”12  The 
United States gradually became more invested in Pakistan as the decade progressed, despite 
lingering concerns over the violence between Pakistan and India.     
A National Security Staff Study in 1951 recommended that the United States “pursue our 
objectives in South Asia with more vigor.”13  As British influence in the area declined, the 
United States decided that it should pursue arms assistance matters with Pakistan 
independently.
14
  The situation in Kashmir remained in a “deadlock,” and the problems between 
India and Pakistan created significant anxiety for United States policymakers regarding entering 
into a stronger military relationship with Pakistan.
15
  In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “The trouble with Pakistan at 
the moment is that we do not have any program of military aid for Pakistan, because we don’t 
dare do it because of the repercussions on India.”16  The commander of Pakistan’s armed forces 
and future president, Ayub Khan, met with then Vice President Richard Nixon in an effort to 
convince him to increase military aid to Pakistan because he believed that the Soviet Union 
would use India as a “cat’s-paw for establishing a major presence in South Asia.”17   
The United States Ambassador to India warned American politicians that large amounts 
of aid to Pakistan would be a “mistake” because it would enmesh the United States in the 
                                                 
12
 “35 ‘Country Statement’ on Pakistan, enclosed in McGhee’s memorandum to James Bruce, Director of 
MDAP, 10 February 1950 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 20. 
13
 “52 NSC Staff Study (98/1): ‘The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia,’ January 
1951 (approved by President Truman on 25 January 1951) (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 44. 
14
 “63 Telegram from Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, George C. McGhee, to Avra M. Warren, US 
Ambassador in Pakistan, 11 August 1951 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 65.  
15“90 Report by the President of the UN Security Council on discussions with India and Pakistan on the 
Kashmir question, 29 April 1957 (Extract)” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 87. 
16
 “80 Testimony by Secretary of State Dulles in the executive session of the Senate CFR, 3 June 1953 
(Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 78.  
17
 “86 Extracts from the Memoirs of Richard Nixon on his visit to Pakistan, 7-9 December 1953 (Extract),” 
America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 84.  
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regional problems between Pakistan and India.
18
  The ambassador also thought it was unlikely 
that the Soviet Union would send its forces into the Middle East, and if they did, Pakistan would 
most likely remain “aloof.”19  Concerns over exacerbating tension between Pakistan and India by 
providing military assistance to Pakistan continued to plague the Pakistan-United States 
relationship; but by 1953, the United States became less ambiguous toward Pakistan and 
significantly altered its position on an arms sales relationship. 
On a visit to Pakistan in 1953, Dulles stated that Pakistan was a “dependable bulwark 
against communism.”20  He described meetings between him and Pakistani officials as having a 
“feeling of warm friendship.”21  In 1954, after the announcement that Turkey and Pakistan 
intended to cooperate to maintain peace and security in the Middle East, the United States 
responded with political support and guarantees of military assistance in the form of equipment 
and training.
22
  The Baghdad Pact between Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey garnered American 
sympathies.  The United States was extremely supportive of the Baghdad Pact and the 
collaboration of ‘northern tier’ countries.  The Baghdad Pact formed the “link connecting NATO 
on the West and SEATO on the East, thus completing the strategic defensive perimeter.”23  
Prime Minister of Pakistan, H. S. Subrawardy, explained the importance of the American 
association with the Baghdad Pact: 
                                                 
18
 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 
(Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77.  
19
 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 
(Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77. 
20
 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 
(Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77. 
21
 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 
(Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77. 
22
 “94 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA Henry A. Byroade before the Hellenic-American 
Chamber of Commerce, New York, 5 March 1954 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 92.  
23
 “126 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA George V. Allen in the hearings before the 
House CFA on the Mutual Security Act of 1956, 24 April 1956 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 122. 
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The question is asked.  Why don’t we (the Muslim countries) get together rather than be 
tied to a big power like the UK or America?  My answer is that zero plus zero plus zero is 
after all equal to zero.  We have, therefore, to go farther afield rather than get all the zeros 
together because they will never be able to produce something substantial.
24
 
 
This statement indicates an awareness of the power of the United States and the reason 
Pakistan desired a close relationship with America.  Pakistan’s numerous alliances, such as 
SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, assured the United States that it had a partner against the 
expansion of communism, which then motivated the United States to supply Pakistan with 
military assistance. Another important connection between Pakistan and the United States was 
the Mutual Security Act of 1954.  Pakistan’s nickname, “America’s most allied ally in Asia,” 
was based on the growing political ties between the United States and Pakistan.
25
  One reason the 
United States wanted to maintain multiple alliances with Pakistan was the concern that the Soviet 
Union would one day push to the south through Pakistan or Afghanistan in an effort to obtain a 
warm-water port in the oil rich region of the Persian Gulf.  Assistant Secretary of State George 
Allen stated before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that he could not predict exactly 
when or if Pakistan would be attacked by the Soviet Union.
26
  But the United States government 
had not forgotten that, in 1940, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, 
affirmed that “the territorial ambitions of the Soviet Union lay south to the Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean.”27  Pakistan benefitted militarily from American anxieties regarding Soviet 
intentions in the Middle East and South Asia.   
                                                 
24
 “132 NSC 5701: ‘U.S. Policy toward South Asia,’ 10 January 1957 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan 
Relations, vol. 1, 125. 
25
 “228 Address by Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan to US, at the Naval War College, New Port, 
Rhode Island, 14 May 1963 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 221.  
26
 “108 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA George V. Allen in the hearings before the 
Senate CFR on the Mutual Security Act of 1955, 12 May 1955 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 107. 
27
 “108 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA George V. Allen in the hearings before the 
Senate CFR on the Mutual Security Act of 1955, 12 May 1955 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 107. 
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The United States continued to favor Pakistan throughout the late 1950s.  A United States 
communication center was approved for construction in Peshawar, Pakistan, which is significant 
because Pakistani officials were formerly wary of allowing American armed forces to establish 
facilities on Pakistani soil.
28
  Maintained by the United States Air Force, this accession was an 
important step toward cooperation against communist activities in the Middle East and Asia.  In 
1959, the United States and Pakistan signed a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, 
“strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship” between them.29   
The most important seal of Pakistan-United States relations was the 1959 Agreement of 
Cooperation between Pakistan and the United States.  The document specifically referenced the 
Baghdad Pact, and included an explicit agreement to “cooperate for their security and    
defense.”30  This union drew Pakistan and the United States closer, but a lack of clarity on 
whether the agreement applied to aggression from India later led to Pakistani disenchantment 
with America.  The United States recognized that the “broad and loose wording” of the 
agreement misled Pakistani officials and caused them to believe that this agreement applied to 
security threats from “any source.”31  The United States only meant the agreement to pertain to 
communism, hence the reference to the Baghdad Pact.  Yet, this misunderstanding eventually 
contributed to reoccurring disillusionment in Pakistan with United States foreign policy.  
 Nor did the advancement of the Pakistan-United States relationship go unnoticed by 
India.  The United States had been giving India economic and developmental aid for years.  The 
                                                 
28“176 Department of State press release on the establishment of a communications facility at Peshawar in 
Pakistan, 18 July 1959,” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 169. 
29
 “US-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, 12 November 1959 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan 
Relations, vol. 1, 173. 
30
 “Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Pakistan,” 5 March 1959, Digital National Security Archive, Afghanistan: The Making of U.S 
Policy, 1973-1990 Collection. (accessed August 20 August 2011) <http://gateway.proquest.com.jproxy.lib. 
.cu.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa &rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CAF00002>.  
31
 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed U.S. Assistance and Arms Transfers to Pakistan: An 
Assessment, 97
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 1981, 33. 
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United States did not want India to approach a level of economic poverty that would lead it to 
embrace communism.  The United States ultimate goal was to curb communism in South Asia 
but the United States could not achieve its objective without angering Pakistan.  Balancing 
regional objectives and alliances with global interests would continue to adversely affect United 
States foreign policy, specifically in regard to its relationship with Pakistan.   
In a 1959 meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Acting Secretary of 
State Douglas Dillon and committee-members analyzed the costs and benefits of aiding both 
countries simultaneously.  One senator made a revealing statement that emphasized America’s 
conundrum in South Asia and the volatility of the Kashmir issue. 
Senator Sparkman: We are in a way indirectly subsidizing both India and Pakistan to 
enable them to maintain the forces they are maintaining, really, against each other.  By 
the way, I was told by officials in both countries who suggested to me that we were more 
or less underwriting their economies to permit them to maintain these heavy forces 
against each other.  I think it is highly important that we do everything we can to get the 
settlement of the Kashmir question. 
Mr. Dillon: I would agree.
32
 
 
Another senator questioned the wisdom of providing aid to Pakistan that would most 
likely be directed at India rather than at the Soviet Union. 
Senator Church: The military assistance program is directed toward the threat of Soviet 
aggression.  Now, we have a case in Pakistan where we are supplying large amounts of 
money to maintain a military force.  The Pakistani feeling is that the threat comes 
primarily from India.  I question very seriously the propriety of spending American funds 
to arm one ally against the threat posed by another.  We are not giving military assistance 
at the present time to India, are we? 
Mr. Dillon:  No, we are not.  I would like to make clear what I said, and I think you noted 
it in your statement, was that this was the Pakistani idea that the threat came from India.  
We do not feel the same concern that Pakistan does about the threat. The aid to Pakistan 
was in connection with Pakistan’s joining the Baghdad Pact, which was a defensive pact 
against the U.S.S.R., and our Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that these forces from our point of 
                                                 
32
 “172 Statement by Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon in the hearings before the Senate CFR on 
the Mutual Security Act of 1959, 13 May 1959 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 166.  
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view would be effective, and useful in the case of all-out trouble with the U.S.S.R. in the 
Middle East region.
33
 
 
These concerns would become extremely relevant in the 1960s after the outbreak of the 1962 
Indo-China War and the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.   
 The beginning of the 1960s foreshadowed the future of turbulent relations between 
Pakistan and the United States.  After the U-2 incident in 1960, when an American spy plane 
originating from the American Air Force installation in Peshawar was shot down over the Soviet 
Union, Pakistan withstood considerable pressure from the U.S.S.R, including the threat of 
“annihilat[ion].”34  The United States recognized Pakistan’s contributions, such as speaking out 
in favor of the ‘Free World,’ but, shortly after, Pakistan began to question America’s allegiance.   
The first major obstacle to the Pakistan-United States relationship occurred when the 
United States began sending military aid to India in response to its conflict with China.  
American arms to India came as a “rude shock” to Pakistanis who felt betrayed by the United 
States.
35
  President Ayub called for rapprochement between India and Pakistan based on a “just 
and honorable settlement of Kashmir” rather than “the injection of massive doses of military aid 
to India.”36  The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, was frustrated that the United 
States aided India when it was “crystal clear to us that India was making a mountain of a mole 
hill and was raising Cain in order to bamboozle the Anglo-American powers.”37  As a result, 
Pakistan began to question its relationship with the United States and its position in world affairs, 
                                                 
33
 “172 Statement by Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon in the hearings before the Senate CFR on 
the Mutual Security Act of 1959, 13 May 1959 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 165. 
34
 “232 Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s speech in the National Assembly, 24 July 1963 (Extract),” America-
Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 222-3. 
35
 Larry A. Niksch, “Pakistan: Situation Report,” The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, 
30 September 1968, 20. 
36
 Ayub Khan, Pakistan Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Pakistan, 1960), 33. 
37
 “222 Statement by Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali in the National Assembly of Pakistan during the 
discussion on the emergency situation arising out of large-scale supply of arms to India, 22 November 1962 
(Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 213. 
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specifically its membership in SEATO and CENTO.  Pakistan began considering neutralism as 
the best way to achieve security.
38
  This change in foreign policy included normalizing relations 
with countries like China, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union. 
 Because they shared a common dislike for India, Pakistan and China engaged in friendly 
diplomacy during the early 1960s.  The advancing relationship between China and Pakistan 
unnerved American policymakers and politicians.  The Sino-Pak relationship was a “mockery” 
to Pakistan’s former anticommunist stance.39  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and later president, told the United States that Pakistan had “moved forward in our 
relations with China but we have not moved backwards in our relations with the United States.”40  
The China factor strained the Pakistan-United States relationship.  The Indo-Pakistan War of 
1965 further pushed Pakistan’s foreign policy away from the United States and toward 
neutralism.     
The beginning of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 occurred in the Rann of Kutch.  India 
claimed that Pakistan was using arms from America in the fighting, which violated earlier 
American guarantees to India.
41
  As hostilities expanded into Kashmir and breached the cease-
fire line, the United States halted military aid to both India and Pakistan.
42
  Pakistan considered 
this “grossly unequal treatment” because the United States was Pakistan’s main supplier of war 
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material while India had access to military equipment from other countries.
43
  Although the 
United States assured Pakistan that the embargo was not intended to be a form of punishment, 
but only an effort to support the United Nations’ peace mission, Pakistan felt betrayed.44  Bhutto 
replied that “if the United States could only act through the Security Council then there was no 
need for alliances.”45   
The United States was in a predicament.  The fighting in Kashmir not only concerned the 
United States because it wanted to maintain its friendship with both countries, but also because 
“just over the Himalayas Red China was sitting, eagerly waiting for a chance to pick up the 
pieces.”46  American policy over the previous decade was to deter China by bolstering Pakistan 
and India, a policy that ultimately backfired.  After the conclusion of the second Indo-Pakistan 
War, the United States instituted a policy of arms restraint on the subcontinent.  The United 
States enacted a policy of only selling non-lethal weapons to Pakistan and India, which affected 
Pakistan much more severely because the United States was its main supplier of weapons.  
 Tensions between India and Pakistan continued to elevate after India began developing 
nuclear technology in the late 1960s.  Bhutto threatened: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat 
grass or leaves, even go hungry.  But we will get one of our own.”47  The escalation of the arms 
race and nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent became a hindrance to the Pakistan-United 
States relationship from the 1960s to the present.  The Indo-China War of 1962 and the Indo-
Pakistan War of 1965 had a lasting impact on the relationship between the United States and 
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Pakistan.  No longer were strong alliances and military sales the most prominent characteristics 
of the relationship.  Rather, Pakistan improved its relationships with China and the Soviet Union, 
America’s sworn enemies in the fight against communism. 
In a 1968 situation report by Larry Niksch, an Asian affairs analyst for the Congressional 
Research Service, it was apparent that Pakistan had forgone its close ties with the United States 
and moved considerably closer to a foreign policy based on neutrality.  The “triangular policy” 
of Pakistan allowed the country to receive some form of either economic or military aid from 
China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.
48
  Maintaining friendly relations with the three 
nations required Pakistan to “constantly walk a tightrope.”49  Yet, the “triangular policy” was 
considered a “success” and positively contributed to Pakistan’s economic and developmental 
progress.
50
  The United States continued to send economic aid to Pakistan despite its associations 
with the communist powers.  For example, the United States contributed fifty million dollars to 
the construction of the Tarbela Dam.
51
  
 Nonetheless, the military alliance was in decline.  Pakistan no longer played an active 
role in SEATO or CENTO, illustrating the country’s policy shift to neutralism.  By 1968, the 
“special relationship” between Pakistan and the United States that was founded on the Mutual 
Security Act of 1954 and the Bilateral Agreement of 1959 had “ceased to exist.”52  The United 
States was asked to let its lease on the facility in Peshawar run out without renewal in 1969.
53
  
The United States no longer needed the station because the information was available elsewhere, 
but the closing of the American installation allowed Pakistan to receive arms sales from the 
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Soviet Union.
54
  The Pakistan-United States relationship became strained during the 1960s and 
events in the 1970s would continue to test the former allies’ commitment to each another.  
In October 1970, the United States approved a request from Pakistan for 300 armored 
personnel carriers.
55
  The United States also sold Pakistan a small amount of weapons and 
replacement parts, making a “one-time exception” to America’s policy of selling only non-lethal 
military supplies to Pakistan.  As military aid continued to trickle into Pakistan, South Asia 
entered into another crisis that would lead to the third Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.   
The ties between East and West Pakistan eroded due to East Pakistan’s desire for 
autonomy.  These tensions resulted in a civil war in East Pakistan.  The United States 
implemented a policy of “quiet diplomacy,” in which the United States would not condemn 
Pakistan’s actions and would continue to send small amounts of military and economic 
assistance.
56
  America’s public opinion was that the conflict was an “internal matter” and the 
strong powers such as India or the Soviet Union should not interfere.
57
   Efforts toward 
negotiation were fruitless, and from March to November between 200,000 and one million 
people died.
58
   
The Pakistan Army began targeting Hindus in East Pakistan, many of whom 
subsequently fled to India.
59
  The United States and United Nations tried to alleviate the pressure 
of the refugees on India and avert further tensions between India and Pakistan by sending 
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humanitarian aid to India, but their efforts were unsuccessful.
60
  India trained over 50,000 rebels 
and refugees in India to fight the Pakistan army in East Pakistan.
61
  Diplomacy failed and the 
Indian Army moved into East Pakistan where hostilities broke out.  The United States declared 
that India’s military intervention was “unjustified” and suspended all arms equipment sales to 
India, but not to Pakistan, which was a notably different policy than America followed in the 
Indo-Pakistan War in 1965.
62
 
The United States did not directly intervene on the behalf of Pakistan, but it did not 
abandon Pakistan either.  Maintaining the balance of power in Asia was a priority of the Nixon 
administration.  In 1971, India and the Soviet Union announced the Soviet-Indian Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.
63
  Nixon perceived the Indo-Pakistan war as a “vehicle for 
the expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia.”64  During the war, Nixon was also pursuing 
détente with China, which supported Pakistan.  The fragile diplomacy between China and the 
United States hinged on America not alienating Pakistan.
65
  President Richard Nixon’s National 
Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, told the Washington Special Advisory Group (WSAG): “I 
am getting hell every half hour from the president that we are not being tough on India.  He has 
just called me again.  He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes.  He wants us to tilt in 
favor of Pakistan.  He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.”66   
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Nixon wanted it to be clear that any encroachment on West Pakistan by India would be 
unacceptable.  He ordered a task force, which included the aircraft carrier Enterprise, to the Bay 
of Bengal.
67
  This decision was done under the guise of evacuating United States citizens, and 
according to Kissinger, the actual purpose was “to give emphasis on our warnings against an 
attack on West Pakistan.”68  Future American diplomatic relations in Asia and the Middle East 
depended on American policy during the Indo-Pakistan War.   
In another WSAG meeting, Kissinger said that “Everyone knows that India will 
ultimately occupy East Pakistan.”69  He also stated, “The UN is likely to be an exercise in 
futility,” because the Soviet Union would veto anything detrimental to India.70  Not only was 
Nixon concerned about the integrity of Pakistan, and the potential effects of the war on the Sino-
American détente, he similarly worried about the reputation of the United State in the Middle 
East.  If West Pakistan was overcome by India there would be grave implications on the 
relationships between America and its other allies.  The United States did not want countries in 
the Middle East, such as Iran, to question the United States’ dependability on issues of Soviet 
influence or encroachment.  When the war ended, West Pakistan maintained its sovereignty.  
Prime Minister Bhutto expressed his thanks to both China and the United States for 
supporting the preservation of West Pakistan.
71
  In an interview for a broadcast by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, Bhutto was questioned about his opinion of Indian intentions toward 
Pakistan. 
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Q.  If this was, however, still a fundamental aim of Indian policy [to end partition and 
reabsorb Pakistan] couldn’t they have finished the job last time? 
A. Yes, they might have and I think they intended to, but the world situation was there 
and the world powers took an active attitude towards the conflict finally and the United 
States put a foot down and so India declared a unilateral ceasefire.  I don’t think it was a 
voluntary declaration.
72
 
  
The posture of the United States toward Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars was 
markedly different.  In the earlier war, the United States put a complete embargo on Pakistan.  In 
the later war, America discarded its policy of strict neutrality between Pakistan and India.  It 
acted on its own by sending a task force to the Indian Ocean, rather than leaving the matter 
completely in the hands of the United Nations. The American tilt toward Pakistan during the 
Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 strengthened the relationship between Pakistan and the United States 
and advanced American relations with China.  Although the most significant threats to Pakistan’s 
integrity came from Indian conflicts, events in Afghanistan during the 1970s began to capture the 
world’s attention. 
 Pakistan’s history has often been deeply affected by its relations with and events in 
neighboring countries.  Border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan plagued the countries’ 
relationship since their inception.  The Durand Line, which staked the northern and western 
boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was constantly a source of friction between the two 
countries.  Afghanistan also advocated political autonomy for the Pashtu-speaking people in 
Pakistan.  Afghanistan, partnered with India, “continuously agitated” the “Pushtunistan” issue, 
which was likened to the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan.
73
  Pakistan felt 
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surrounded by hostile nations, especially after Afghanistan and India signed a Treaty of 
Friendship in 1951.
74
   
Furthermore, Pakistan was concerned with Afghanistan’s commercial dependence on the 
Soviet Union.  After a coup in Afghanistan in 1973, Mohammed Daoud assumed leadership and 
implemented pro-Soviet policies.
75
  The strengthening of the Soviet-Afghan relationship sent a 
“shockwave of apprehension” through Pakistan and neighboring countries.76  Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan had the potential to further exacerbate ethnic divisions in Pakistan and Iran.  The 
Baluchis, a group which spanned across Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, desired political 
independence.  Pakistan and Iran were concerned that the Soviet Union would foment unrest in 
Baluchistan in an effort to gain control of the region and thereby gain access to the Persian Gulf 
where it could establish a warm-water port.
77
  In 1973, Iran invited America to assess Iran’s 
defense capabilities on its border with Afghanistan after the Soviet Union supplied Afghanistan 
with advanced aircraft.
78
 
The Soviet Union continued to support the Daoud government, which concerned the 
United States.  In a telegram from the American Embassy in Karachi to State Department 
officials in Washington, the American ambassador called attention to speculation that Leonid 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had noticed “U.S. war 
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weariness and preoccupation with domestic affairs” during the Washington Summit.79  Brezhnev 
concluded that “this [was a] safe time [to] take [a] major step to bolster [the] Soviet position in 
South Asia and [the] Persian Gulf region.”80  While the United States and Pakistan became 
increasingly alarmed with developments in Afghanistan, their relationship rapidly eroded. 
The continuance of the arms embargo on lethal weapons constituted the major source of 
disagreement between the United States and Pakistan.  Bhutto claimed that Pakistan was being 
“singled out” and treated unjustly.81  Kissinger agreed, and argued that withholding weapons 
sales from an ally whose Indian neighbor was stockpiling massive amounts of arms was 
“morally, politically, and symbolically improper.”82  After India tested a nuclear device in 1974, 
Pakistan tried to persuade the United States to lift the embargo or accept Pakistan’s pursuit of 
nuclear technology. 
Bhutto explained that Pakistan would not need a nuclear weapon if it could defend itself 
by conventional means.
83
  He told India that, if the United States lifted the embargo, it should not 
cause fear in India because it would only rectify “the anomaly whereby an ally of the United 
States was denied the right to purchase American arms for self defense.”84  When Pakistan did 
not receive an offer of weapons sales, it turned to France to acquire a reprocessing plant.  
Tensions over nuclear proliferation progressively worsened.  In a meeting between Kissinger and 
Bhutto, Kissinger stated that Pakistan should not “insult the intelligence” of the United States by 
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claiming the reprocessing plant was for peaceful, energy-related purposes.
85
  Bhutto later 
claimed that Kissinger threatened him by saying he must end nuclear development or the United 
States “would make a horrible example of him.”86  Bhutto responded by stating that no country 
had the right to tell Pakistan what it could or could not do.
87
  The meeting highlighted the 
quickly deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the United States. 
Shortly after the meeting, Pakistan held its 1977 elections.  Protests and accusations of 
corruption against Bhutto erupted on the streets of Pakistan, which Bhutto blamed on a “colossal 
international conspiracy.”88  Bhutto claimed that the “political bloodhounds were after him” 
because he refused to comply with American insistence on halting the nuclear program.
89
  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance denied any American interference with the elections in Pakistan 
and warned Bhutto of making public statements that would damage the Pakistan-United States 
relationship.
90
  Zia al-Huq displaced Bhutto in a bloodless coup, but the relationship between 
Pakistan and the United States did not improve. 
In 1977, the United States implemented the Symington Amendment, which allowed 
Congress to halt economic and military assistance to any country that tried to acquire nuclear 
weapons technology.
91
  The diplomatic alliances that had bound the two countries together in the 
1950s completely broke down.  In March 1979, Pakistan withdrew from CENTO, which had 
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“not turned out to be too meaningful an organization.”92  Zia stated that the United States never 
stood by its allies when the “chips were down.”93  He recounted American neutrality during the 
1965 Indo-Pakistan War and asserted that “when the crunch came, Pakistan was left alone.”94  
The lowest point in the Pakistan-United States relationship occurred in 1979. 
In November of 1979, Pakistani sentiment toward the United States flared into open 
hostility after a radio report incorrectly blamed Americans for violence in Mecca on the Holy 
Kabaa.
95
  An angry mob breached the American Embassy compound in Islamabad, and four 
personnel died, including one U.S. Marine.
96
  The American Center in Lahore and the American 
Cultural Center in Rawalpindi were also attacked and burned.
97
  Serious questions arose about 
the amount of time it took for Pakistan to respond to the attacks.
98
  During the most volatile time 
of Pakistan and American diplomacy, events in Afghanistan indicated future instability in the 
region. 
The Communist Party in Afghanistan struggled to remain in control due to increased 
resistance from rebels.  The Soviet Union’s investment in a pro-Soviet, communist Afghanistan 
was in serious jeopardy.  The potential overthrow of the Afghan regime would be a damaging 
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setback to the Soviet Union’s “international prestige” and had the potential to replace Soviet 
influence with Chinese or Pakistani influence.
99
  The Soviet Union started analyzing its options 
in Afghanistan, which ranged from completely abandoning efforts there to launching a full-scale 
invasion. 
In 1979, the uncertainty in Afghanistan combined with the fall of the Shah in Iran 
unnerved leaders in both Pakistan and the United States.  A Soviet occupied Afghanistan would 
constitute a “legitimate” threat to Pakistan’s security and America’s attempt to contain 
communism.
100
  When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, Pakistan 
and the United States gained a common interest: countering the Russians in Afghanistan.  This 
common interest eventually revitalized the Pakistan-United States relationship, but not without 
difficulty. 
Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan embarked on a 
diplomatic relationship characterized by strength but degraded by Pakistan’s confrontations with 
India and disagreements over arm sales.  America’s aid to India during the Sino-Indian War of 
1962 and the embargo on arms to Pakistan after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War amounted to the end 
of a close relationship and the disillusionment in Pakistan with the United States.  In Pakistan’s 
opinion, the 1959 Agreement was a meaningless document that signified a lack of American 
commitment to Pakistan.  American reaction to the conflicts between Pakistan and India served 
as the greatest irritant between the United States and Pakistan. 
From 1947-1979, American policies toward Pakistan remained in flux.  President Dwight 
Eisenhower “favored Pakistan over India” in an effort to establish intelligence gathering outposts 
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in Pakistan.
101
  He also oversaw Pakistan’s entrance into important alliances such as SEATO and 
CENTO.  During the Kennedy Administration, progress toward a sturdy relationship reversed.  
The pro-Indian initiatives during the early 1960s were detrimental to Pakistan’s opinion of the 
United States and signified the beginning of the declining bonds.  The Nixon Administration’s 
détente with China caused India to nurture its relationship with the Soviet Union.  The Johnson 
Administration, which implemented a policy of “using aid as a club” only “intensified the core 
problems” of the relationship.102  With the emergence of nuclear proliferation on the 
subcontinent, the United States further alienated Pakistan by selling enriched uranium to India.
103
  
Pakistan perceived these actions as “hypocrisy in U.S. non-proliferation policy.”104  The 
inconsistent policies of the United States, and its vacillations between New Delhi and Islamabad 
cased the United States to have “poor relations with both simultaneously.”105  Washington’s 
inability to create an effective policy in South Asia was caused by “myriad challenges” and 
“contrary interests, priorities, commitments, and decisions of other actors.”106   
Another reason for the irregularity of American policies can be attributed to its internal 
politics.  Traditionally, Republicans tended to show “greater understanding of and sympathy for 
Pakistan.”107  This tendency is illustrated in the case of President Robert Kennedy and Richard 
Nixon.  Later, it is also apparent in the case of President Carter and Ronald Reagan.  No matter 
the leaders of the United States or Pakistan, the ultimate failure of the Pakistan-United States 
relationship was the “fundamental dichotomy between the American and Pakistani perceptions 
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of the basis of their alliance.”108  Pakistan entered into alliances with the United States on the 
assumption that America would take Pakistan’s side during conflicts with India.  The United 
States’ main motivation originated from the desire to counter Soviet presence in South Asia and 
the Middle East.  Ultimately, both nations were disappointed.  Pakistan cultivated a close 
relationship with China and the Soviet Union detected an opportunity to exert its influence in 
Afghanistan.  South Asia was “sucked into the Cold War vortex.”109  The emergence of a 
common threat in South Asia, however, gave Pakistan and the United States the impetus to 
rekindle the smoldering relationship.   
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Chapter 2: The Pakistan-Unites States Relationship during the First Afghan Crisis 
Since Pakistan was created in 1947, its relationship with the United States has wavered 
between an ally and an uncomfortable acquaintance.  The relationship had moved across a 
spectrum, from Pakistan being “America’s most allied ally in Asia” in the 1950s, to a sense of 
betrayal in Pakistan because of the lack of American intervention during its defeat in the Indo-
Pakistan War of 1965 and the loss of East Pakistan in 1971.
110
  The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan led to a repetition of the oscillating relationship between Pakistan and the United 
States.  But this cycle was different because it included the all-time peak of the relationship in 
1986, when Pakistan and the United States not only reached a firm foundation of their friendship 
through a generous American six-year aid plan to Pakistan, but also coordinated a massive effort 
to mobilize the mujahidin in Afghanistan and turn the tide of war against the Soviet Union.  Yet, 
within a few years, the bilateral partnership between the United States and Pakistan returned to 
cool relations reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s because of the reemergence of the same 
obstacles: Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, tensions with India, and the lack of democratic 
institutions.  To understand this pattern, it is necessary to analyze the galvanizing event that 
sparked the rekindling of the Pakistan-United States relationship – the Soviet Union’s 
intervention in Afghanistan. 
A turning point in the relationship between the United States and Pakistan came in 1979.  
As the year progressed, the relations between the two countries deteriorated over myriad issues.  
Because of continued speculation about Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear program, the United 
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States suspended aid to Pakistan.
111
  Nuclear anxieties and the arms race on the subcontinent 
compounded the strained relations between Pakistan and India.  By the end of the 1979, 
however, Pakistan’s strategic value to the United States and regional threats to Pakistan led to 
further efforts by both countries to revitalize the Pakistan-United States relationship.  The best 
interests of both countries led to cooperation in addressing the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
 President Zia al-Huq and other high-ranking officials perceived the crisis in Afghanistan 
as an opportunity to advance their army’s capabilities.  According to specialist A. Z. Hilali: “Zia 
and his colleagues took the decision to get involved in Afghanistan because they saw it as 
militarily and economically profitable.”112  The modernization of Pakistan’s outdated weapons 
and defense systems would also serve as a deterrent to India.  Another reason Pakistan wanted to 
aid the Afghan rebels was Pakistan’s desire for strategic depth against India.113  Zia thought that, 
if the Soviet Union could be expelled from Afghanistan and a government friendly to Pakistan 
could be installed in Afghanistan, Pakistan would gain influence in the region not only by 
solving decades-old border disputes but also by avoiding a pro-Indian neighbor.
114
  Pakistan was 
not the only country that had a reason to be involved in Afghanistan. 
  The significance of Pakistan in American foreign policy immediately expanded as the 
Cold War suddenly escalated and Russian troops entered Afghanistan on 24 December 1979.  
President James “Jimmy” Carter termed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as “the greatest 
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threat to World Peace since the Second World War.”115  Not only was the Persian Gulf 
considered the “oil jugular” of the West, but also Soviet interference in Afghanistan represented 
an aggressive violation of international norms.
116
 Soviet leaders decided to intervene on the 
behalf of the struggling communist leadership in Kabul, citing the Brezhnev Doctrine as their 
cause.  While the Brezhnev Doctrine referred specifically to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, the same justification was used in the case of Afghanistan.  As Leonid Brezhnev had urged 
in a speech, solidarity with “fraternal” and socialist countries was a state priority.117  
  In Carter’s 1980 State of the Union Address, the president underscored the American 
commitment to the Persian Gulf region and its steady supply of oil.  Not only did Carter declare 
that any “attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf . . . will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force,” but he publicly announced that the 1959 
agreement with Pakistan had been reconfirmed and the United States was committed to 
preserving Pakistan’s “independence and its integrity.”118  These public statements highlighted 
the increasing attention to Pakistan and the greater region, yet, it is important to note that the 
reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement only pertained to a communist threat to Pakistan, not a 
threat emanating from India.
119
  This detail had been a sore point in Pakistan-United States 
foreign policy since 1965 and significantly hindered the renewal of the Pakistan-United States 
relationship.    
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Another chaffing point in that relationship was the suspension of American aid to 
Pakistan in 1979 and Pakistan’s desperate desire to acquire military supplies.  Under the Carter 
administration, millions of dollars of military aid for training programs were cut because 
Pakistan refused to end its nuclear program.
120
 After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan’s “insecurity dilemma” heightened and Pakistani officials viewed a military sales 
relationship as the most important aspect for Pakistan to initiate cooperation with the United 
States.
121
  When Pakistan became a “frontline state,” its Korean War-era weaponry and defense 
systems needed to be updated to meet the Soviet threat on its western border.
122
  This element 
was Pakistan’s most immediate concern; but Carter was not as accommodating or as generous as 
the Pakistani government wanted.   
 When Carter arrived in office in 1977, Congress had set a record for supporting controls 
and restraints on United States arms transfers, a policy which Carter expanded by adding a more 
strict set of restrictions, most notably including the prohibition of selling new and advanced 
weaponry.
123
  Carter announced that he intended to support a policy of further arms restraints, 
and arms transfers would be “an exceptional foreign policy implement.”124  “Extraordinary 
circumstances” were required for the president to issue a presidential waiver to countries such as 
Pakistan that had violated the terms for qualifying for arms sales.
125
  The most immediate 
obstacle to approving any arms transfer to Pakistan was Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons 
program.  
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 After aid was suspended in 1979 over nuclear proliferation violations, Carter and the 
United States Congress had to decide whether to override the existing legislation that prohibited 
arms sales or aid to a country that was suspected of developing nuclear weapons capabilities.  On 
6 January 1980, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the United States and 
Pakistan were faced with an “exceptional situation,” referring to the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan.
126
  On 1 February 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requested an “exception to 
existing legislation” from the Senate Appropriations Committee.127  It is clear that policymakers 
were trying to make the case that the situation in Pakistan was anything but ordinary and the 
Glenn-Symington Amendment that barred aid to countries pursuing nuclear programs needed to 
be lifted so military materials could flow into Pakistan.
128
  In a State Department cable to several 
American embassies, the situation in Southwest Asia was described as “extraordinary” and, 
although Carter had approved military and economic aid to Pakistan, the United States 
government would still maintain its policy by pressing for a halt to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program.
129
  Although policymakers stressed the exceptional and extraordinary conditions 
regarding Pakistan, using the exact words of Carter’s Arms Transfers Policy of 1977, and Carter 
agreed to renew aid to Pakistan, the United States failed to produce a satisfactory offer. 
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 The United States proposed a 400 million dollar aid package, divided equally between 
military and economic aid, which Zia rejected as “peanuts.”130  Zia complained that the offer was 
“devoid of credibility and durability.”131  Zia’s response referred to the perceived American bias 
to India, lingering distrust from the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, and the mere two year extension for 
the offer.
132
  Also, the proposal was supposedly “wrapped up in onerous conditions.”133  Pakistan 
had been clear that it was a non-aligned state and would not enter into an entangling aid 
relationship.  Zia even threatened accommodation with the Soviet Union.
134
  He stated in 
February 1980: 
 If the US is going to help Pakistan, let it come whole hog.  If I accept such a meaningless 
level of aid, I will only provoke the Russians without really getting a defence against them.  I 
will burn my bridges: Do you really want me to do that? 
 
Pakistan continued to talk tough throughout Carter’s presidency and accused Carter’s 
administration of “ostrich symptom.”135  Pakistan wanted arms sales through credit; and to Zia 
the 400 million dollar offer was “not even a drop in the ocean.”136  Although the first offer from 
the United States was dismissed, the relationship between the heads of state and their respective 
countries still appeared promising. 
 At a dinner given in honor of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in Pakistan, 
Zia stated that, although relations between Pakistan and the United States had “gone under 
strains,” they were not snapped and he was encouraged that the United States, Pakistan’s 
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“traditional ally,” was attempting to reestablish its ties with its “lost Asian ally.”137 In response, 
Brzezinski emphasized that the United States wanted to renew its friendship with Pakistan and 
work together to confront the Soviet threat in Afghanistan.
138
  In an interview with Walter 
Cronkite in May 1980, Zia presented Pakistan as an “island of stability,” and encouraged the 
United States to be more assertive rather than “hibernate and go back into the shell.”139  He 
further explained: “The period of pre-1919 is over, Mr. Cronkite, your country today is the 
beacon light of the free world and it has to act that way.”140  Zia was unimpressed with the 
hesitant and mild proposals of the Carter administration and encouraged the United States 
policymakers to be more bold and generous.  Carter adhered to the arms sales policies outlined in 
1977, and offered weapons to Pakistan, but he failed to finalize an arrangement with Pakistan.   
Thomas Thornton, an expert on South Asian affairs, described Washington’s Pakistan 
policy under Carter as a “near total failure.”141 While Carter struggled to reach an agreement 
with Zia, Carter did act with “swiftness” by sending rifles to mujahidin (Afghan freedom 
fighters) in Pakistan within two weeks of the Soviet invasion.
142
  Carter made limited progress by 
authorizing covert operations in Pakistan, which included training the mujahidin.  A Special 
Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council provided for light infantry weapons 
for the mujahidin.
143
  The Carter administration also contributed about 700 million dollars over a 
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span of approximately three years to the rebels.  Politically, America tried to reassure Pakistan of 
its commitment in the region by reaffirming the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation.  There was an 
“upsurge” 144 in pro-United States sentiment after Brzezinski’s affirmations of friendship and 
solidarity between the two nations to confront the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, although it 
is undeniable that an element of uncertainty and distrust from the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and 
America’s failure to intervene on the behalf of Pakistan reignited feelings in Pakistanis that 
America had “let Pakistan down” before and was likely to do it again.145  The aid to the 
mujahidin that trickled into Pakistan under Carter turned into a flood under President Ronald 
Reagan and the military sales relationship and diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and the 
United States improved dramatically.   
Reagan’s foreign policy differed greatly from that of Carter’s.  Reagan’s foreign policy of 
seeking a steady alliance with Pakistan was markedly more aggressive than Carter’s foreign 
policy.  Reagan, a ‘super-hawk,’ called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” in a 1983 speech in 
Orlando, Florida. 
146
  Rather than fully embracing the concept of containment, Reagan went 
further by advocating ‘rolling back’ any advance of communism.  This principle applied to the 
Soviet Union’s presence in Afghanistan.  To counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
Reagan considered the transfer of conventional arms “an essential element of its [United States] 
global defense posture and an indispensible component” of American foreign policy.147  Unlike 
Carter’s policies, there was also no explicit mention of the human rights factor when deciding 
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whether to supply a nation with weapons.  Reagan stated that the “United States cannot defend 
the Free World alone;” it needed the help of its friends and allies, especially ‘Third World’ 
countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, to deter and combat Soviet aggression.
148
  In the 
case of Pakistan, Reagan believed that punishing Pakistan by cutting off aid had not had the 
desired effect of ending Pakistan’s nuclear program; and rather, American policies would be 
more effective if they satisfied the security anxieties of Pakistan.
149
  With a more expansive 
policy concerning arms transfers to Pakistan than Carter, Reagan and Zia were much better 
suited to create a mutually beneficial relationship based on arms sales. 
In 1981, over 300 Soviet aircraft crossed the Afghan border into Pakistan; and, in twelve 
of the incidents firing occurred.
150
  Five people died from Soviet-Kabul air attacks in 1981 and, 
as time progressed, the casualties increased.
151
  These air violations underscored the need for 
Pakistan to acquire more sophisticated air defense systems to protect its border regions.  Zia 
called attention to the geostrategic importance of Pakistan to the United States’ oil demands by 
reminding policymakers that Pakistan was the “back door to the gulf’ and should not be 
neglected.
152
  Pakistan demonstrated the need for improved defense capabilities and emphasized 
the benefit to the United States of providing these advancements to Pakistan.  
In June 1981, Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the emerging 
relationship between Pakistan and the United States in romantic terms, from “courtship” to 
“engagement;” Shahi reminded Americans that the relationship had not yet been 
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“consummated.”153  Shahi made it clear that, to follow the metaphor, a marriage would only 
occur under certain conditions: a relationship based on military sales, not a military pact, so that 
Pakistan could uphold a non-aligned status, and the sale of sophisticated weaponry, most 
specifically the F-16 fighter aircraft which had been a sore point in the Carter-Zia relationship.
154
  
Pakistan considered the Five Year Plan proposed by the United States and totaling approximately 
3.2 billion dollars of credit and aid to be much more agreeable than the previous 400 million 
dollar offer from President Carter.
155
  Although the plan had to be approved annually by 
Congress, the aid program instilled a sense of trust in the Reagan administration.   
In July, the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff, including army, navy and air force 
representatives, joined American leaders of all the military branches to assess Pakistan’s defense 
needs and how the United States could bolster Pakistan’s border defenses.156  Leaders of the 
Pakistani Air Force traveled to the United States to tour an air force base to view the F-16 
aircraft.
157
  Pakistan perceived the sale of forty F-16s as the final step to solidifying the Pakistan-
United States relationship.  A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations in November 1981 
stated that “to all concerned the aircraft are the keystone of the new United States-Pakistani 
relationship.”158  Yet, the sale of F-16s to Pakistan still remained troublesome for several 
reasons.  The F-16 deal was temporarily denied by the House of Representatives Committee on 
Foreign Affairs due to “the Human Rights Situation in Pakistan,” specifically referring to 
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political imprisonment and cruel and unusual punishment.
159
  The transfer of such sophisticated 
aircraft also worried policymakers because of the possible repercussions on United States-Indian 
foreign relations.  The report to Congress warned the lawmakers that no “clear and 
unencumbered foreign policy” existed.160  While the F-16 issue was not finalized in President 
Reagan’s first year of office, the Reagan Administration made measurable progress with the Five 
Year Plan. 
By 1982, the Reagan-Zia relationship became increasingly friendly.  Reagan wrote in his 
diary, “He’s [Zia] a good man (cavalry).  Gave me his word they are not building an atomic or 
nuclear bomb.”161  On two separate occasions in December, both President Zia and President 
Reagan described the “warmth” of the relationship between the two nations.162  The overtly 
friendly nature of the two heads of state marked a critical step to cooperation and was important 
to overcoming the obstacles of the India factor.  In a statement before the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, assured the committee, and by 
extension India, that the 275 million dollars credited to Pakistan for the purchase of F-16s, 
armored personal carriers (APCs), and other weaponry was in no way meant to inflame 
Pakistan’s historic rivalry against India, or to reflect favoritism from the United States, but solely 
for the purpose of defending Pakistan’s western border against the Soviet Union.163   Not only 
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were United States policymakers worried about the reaction to arms sales to Pakistan, Pakistani 
leaders in Islamabad were also worried that if Pakistan faced aggression from India, the United 
States would discontinue aid to Pakistan.
164
  Additionally, Pakistani government officials were 
concerned that the United States would abandon its efforts in Afghanistan and subsequently 
abandon its relationship with Pakistan, forcing Pakistan to deal with the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan without its most powerful ally.
165
  These worries were compounded by the 
difficulties arising from the finalization of the F-16 sale.  
The F-16 issue irritated Pakistan-United States relations.  The F-16s were finally 
approved for sale in November, but the delivery of the first six F-16s was delayed because 
Pakistan refused to purchase them without first being equipped with the radar warning receiver 
used by the United States Air Force (ALR-69).
166
  A secret memo from the office of the Director 
of Central Intelligence lamented the Department of Defense’s refusal to include the USAF radar 
equipment. Not only did denial of the advanced radar technology have the potential to “seriously 
damage the totality of the US-Pakistan relationship,” but also to affect a “serious blow to US 
worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”167  In several reports and intelligence analyses, the CIA 
urged policymakers to take into consideration that the “sale of advanced weapons is the yardstick 
by which Islamabad measures US support.”168  On 7 December 1982, Secretary of Defense 
Casper Weinburger reported to the Associated Press of Pakistan that the issue had been resolved 
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“happily” and the F-16s would be delivered with the sophisticated radar warning receiver ALR-
69.
169
   
Not only did the greatest step toward solidifying the arms sales relationship with Pakistan 
occur in 1982, but the American military increased its presence in the region and both Pakistan 
and the United States cooperated and shared intelligence.  A visit of the Middle East Force 
Command, which operated in the Persian Gulf, to the port of Karachi symbolized the cooperation 
between the two nations.  American officials met with Rear Admiral T. K. Khan, Commander 
Karachi (COMKAR); Rear Admiral I. A. Sirohey, Commander Pakistan Fleet (COMPAK); Rear 
Admiral G. A. Zaidi, Commander Logistics (COMLOG) and later in the week, the Chief and 
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Niazi and Vice Admiral Quadir respectively.
170
  This 
meeting signified a strong partnership between navies that was important for many reasons.  Not 
only did military supplies for both Pakistan and Afghanistan enter through the port of Karachi, 
but the American Rapid Deployment Task Force (RDJTF) was created in 1980 to have its main 
focus on the Persian Gulf region.
171
  Such concentration of naval groups in the Persian Gulf 
reflected the significance of the region to the United States as dictated by the Carter Doctrine (as 
made explicit in the 1980 State of the Union Address).  The initiation of naval cooperation 
constituted a crucial step in the advancement of the United States-Pakistan relationship. 
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President Zia’s pledge to share intelligence gathered by electronic surveillance with the 
United States further strengthened the military partnership further.
172
  Also, President Zia’s 
public denial of channeling foreign weapons to the mujahidin strengthened the relationship by 
allowing the United States to drain the Soviet Union of resources in Afghanistan without being 
publicly accountable.
173
  The strengthening of the military relationship between the United States 
and Pakistan demonstrated not only the amicability between the heads of state, but also the 
“durability and credibility” that Pakistan had made clear it required before entering into a 
military sales relationship.
174
  President Zia addressed Reagan in a speech at the White House on 
7 December, emphasizing common interests and a “friendship mature enough to withstand 
differences of opinion and mirrored by the very candor and sincerity of our mutual 
exchanges.”175  As the diplomatic ties strengthened between Pakistan and the United States, so 
did the military connections. 
The creation of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) on 1 January 1983 
emphasized the importance of the region in American foreign policy and military strategy 
planning.  Its purpose was to deter aggression and bolster the security of Southwest Asia, the 
Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa.  Commander in Chief of USCENTCOM, Lieutenant 
General Robert C. Kingston, explained that USCENTCOM’s responsibilities exceed merely 
guaranteeing the supply of oil, but also include maintaining ties with friendly nations and 
preserving their independence.
176
  In the case of Pakistan, this meant conducting joint military 
exercises and sharing intelligence and technology.  In 1984, a group of experts recommended the 
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most cost-effective way to secure the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan from air 
attacks.
177
  A similar visit occurred in 1985 when USCENTCOM supervised a “survey/assistance 
visit” to Pakistan to assess and propose enhancements to Pakistan’s air force strategy, 
capabilities, maintenance, and other support activities.
178
     
 Because of USCENTCOM’s responsibility to protect United States interests and those of 
its allies, the command prepared several contingency plans, mostly regarding possible Soviet 
invasions or aggression in the region.  CONPLAN 1005 was a secret contingency plan for 
“United States Assistance to Pakistan in Countering a Soviet or Soviet-Supported Attack from 
Afghanistan.”179  USCENTCOM’s presence in the region and its cooperation with Pakistani 
military leaders reflected the growing cooperation between Pakistan and the United States in 
responding to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.  The United States was not only focused on 
the Soviet Union, however, but also Pakistan’s relationship with its other neighbors.   
 A secret memo from the CIA Directorate of Intelligence predicted the safety of United 
States weapons technology in Pakistan from being shared with China “unless major strains 
develop” in the United States-Pakistan relationship.180  Despite the close relationship between 
Pakistan and China, the CIA cite two reasons that they had reasonable faith that Pakistan would 
withhold military weapon technology from China.
181
  Not only did Pakistan sign the Security of 
Military Information Agreement with the United States but also the solution to the F-16 fighter-
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jet and ALR-69 radar issue instilled a sense of trust in Islamabad.
182
  As predicted years before, 
the F-16 agreement had serious and lasting positive effects on the Pakistan-United States 
relationship.  Yet, the CIA did acknowledge the potential risk that China could gain access to 
United States’ weapons if the United States pressured Pakistan over the nuclear issue or 
discontinued military sales to Pakistan.
183
  Tensions between India and Pakistan similarly 
constituted a concern for the United States. 
 The United States knew that Pakistan and India had nuclear programs that were not 
monitored to the extent that the United States wanted and the United States greatly suspected 
Pakistan of attempting to use its nuclear technology for weapons use.  A Department of State 
briefing paper from 1984 placed an emphasis on “encouraging Islamabad and New Delhi to 
resume their normalization dialogue.”184  The United States was not only interested in quelling 
the tensions between Pakistan and India because of nuclear weapons but also because the 
disagreements led India to turn to the Soviet Union for military supplies to continue the arms 
race on the subcontinent.
185
  The continuous anxieties between Pakistan and India often 
interfered with the attention on Afghanistan.  Meanwhile, Reagan and Zia devoted their 
attentions to rebuilding the Pakistan-United States relationship. 
 For Reagan, the fact that Zia “looks us in the eye and tells us he isn’t building a bomb” 
was sufficient to continue the presidential waivers to maintain aid and weapons transfers to 
Pakistan.
186
  Despite significant concerns that the Zia regime was losing favor and stability in 
Pakistan because of Zia’s imposition of martial law and his non-democratic rise to power, the 
United States continued to support Zia because of the depth of the Reagan-Zia relationship.  
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President Zia had also developed a strong relationship with the CIA.  As Charles Cogan, CIA 
division chief for that area, wrote, “Without Zia, there would have been no Afghan war, and no 
Afghan victory.”187  Despite the many obstacles to a perfect relationship, such as internal 
tensions in Pakistan regarding Zia’s leadership, Indo-Pakistan tensions, and the nuclear issue, 
Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, qualified the United States-Pakistan relationship 
in a report to Congress as a “qualified foreign policy success.”188  The success of the Pakistan-
United States relationship peaked, however, in 1986. 
 That year Congress approved a six-year program totaling 4.02 billion dollars in total aid 
to Pakistan.
189
  Of this, 1.74 billion dollars would be for foreign military sales (FMS), 340 
million dollars beginning in 1986.
190
  In a meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammad 
Khan Junejo, Reagan stated that the amount of aid planned for the next six years displayed the 
“durability and continuity of the US commitment to strengthen Pakistan’s defense capabilities in 
the face of Soviet pressures from Afghanistan.”191  Reagan remembered the requirements 
stressed years earlier when Zia refused Carter’s 400 million dollar offer because Zia believed it 
lacked durability.  The State Department issued a memorandum summarizing the joint statement 
on Prime Minister Junejo’s visit issued in Washington on 18 July 1986.  The memo illustrated 
the diplomatic smoothness of the relationship at its height.  The President praised the end of 
martial law in Pakistan and “lauded the return of representative democracy to Pakistan.”192  The 
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Prime Minister reassured Reagan that Pakistan’s nuclear program was not intended for creating 
an explosive device.  This affirmation was important because Pakistan’s aid had been based on 
either presidential or congressional waivers since 1979.  Reagan also acknowledged a 
commitment between India and Pakistan not to preemptively strike one another’s nuclear 
installations while further encouraging bilateral peace efforts between the two nations.  The 
president made it clear that he supported peace initiatives and cooperation in Southwest Asia, 
especially the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).  
The two leaders even discussed the growing narcotics trade in the region and how best to curtail 
its expansion.
193
  The Prime Minister’s meeting with President Reagan addressed all the major 
talking points and was conducted amicably. 
 Another reason that 1986 was the apex of the Pakistan-United States relationship was the 
marked success in turning the tide of war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  In the early 1980s, 
the Reagan administration pursued a policy of providing Soviet weaponry to the mujahidin, 
especially Kalashnikovs and other non-American light weapons, to ensure a level of deniability 
to the international community and Pakistan in particular.  Yet, by the mid-1980s, pressure in 
Congress, specifically from Texas Representative Charlie Wilson, influenced the Reagan 
administration to provide more sophisticated and effective weapons to the mujahidin.  The most 
crucial of these was the newly-developed and exclusive Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
which was introduced to the mujahidin in 1986.  These shoulder mounted missiles provided the 
mujahidin with an opportunity to counter the Soviet Hind gunships that had ruled the air and 
leveled Afghan cities virtually uncontested.  Congress and the CIA provided the mujahidin with 
250 launchers and 1,000 missiles (Costing approximately $200,000 each).
 194
  The mujahidin’s 
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first success occurred on 25 September 1986, when three mujahidin used their Stingers to take 
down three Soviet gunships near the Jelalabad airfield.
195
  Until the Soviet withdrawal, the 
Stingers wreaked havoc on Soviet forces.          
 Using Stingers and other advanced weapons and defense systems required training.  The 
CIA sent several plain clothes agents to assist.  During the 1980s, over a million mujahidin were 
trained in joint Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI-Pakistan’s equivalent of the CIA) and 
CIA camps.
196
 The United States and Pakistan cooperated closely throughout the Afghan War.  
In the early 1980s, “Bill” Casey, the director of the CIA, and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman 
Khan, Director General of the ISI, established a close relationship and kept in direct 
communication.  Money from the CIA went either to arms purchases from countries such as 
China, Egypt, Israel, Britain, or America, or directly to ISI offices in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and 
Quetta.
197
  The weapons were then distributed to one of the seven groups of mujahidin.
198
  The 
influx of arms and aid to Pakistan from the United States, and other nations, led Pakistan to 
become a safe-haven for the mujahidin, where they could train, resupply, and regroup themselves 
before continuing the fight in Afghanistan.  In his article, “Partners in Time: The CIA and 
Afghanistan since 1979,” Charles Cogan describes the Pakistan border as a “psychological Yalu 
River.”199  In roughly a decade, the United States supplied the mujahidin with 2.5 billion dollars 
in arms and equipment.
200
  
 The degree of cooperation and commitment to the mujahidin during this decade is a 
measure of the success of the Pakistan-United States relationship.  The turning point in the war 
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against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan came in 1986, when the United States started providing 
the mujahidin with weapons the United States rarely shared.  Stingers were representative of the 
climax of the cooperation and trust between Pakistan and the United States in the combined 
efforts to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.  Because the American government offered 
Pakistan a six-year commitment of over four billion dollars in the same year, 1986 is the 
pinnacle of the Pakistan-United States relationship. 
In 1987, several obstacles threatened the United States-Pakistan relationship.  The FMS 
component of the six-year plan was temporarily delayed because of difficulties obtaining a 
congressional waiver to the law preventing aid to countries pursuing unsupervised nuclear 
programs.
201
  In the same year, a Pakistani national in Canada, Ashad Pervez, was arrested for 
attempting to illegally export a type of steel used in nuclear applications.
202
  The United States 
Congress was also aware of reports that Pakistan was enriching uranium “well above” the level 
required for peaceful purposes.
203
  Nuclear suspicions complicated the relationship between the 
United States and Pakistan as more evidence surfaced that could be used to halt all aid to 
Pakistan, which in turn would jeopardize the American efforts to aid the mujahidin.  Tensions 
between Pakistan and India continued to worry United States policymakers when a bill was 
introduced to Congress to provide Pakistan with an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system.  In a 
House of Representatives Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, politicians weighed 
the balance between exacerbating the arms race on the subcontinent, reassuring India that 
advanced AEW systems were only intended for use against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and 
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remaining a “reliable source of military aid” to Pakistan.204  While the Pakistan-United States 
relationship remained intact in 1987, and the cooperation between Pakistan and the United States 
in regard to the Afghan War continued, 1988 signaled the imminent collapse of the relationship. 
The final accomplishment of the United States and Pakistan was the forced withdrawal of 
the Soviet Union outlined in the Geneva Accords.  The Geneva Accords called for a return to 
normalized relations and “good-neighborliness” between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the 
United States emerged as the watchdog and enforcer of the Soviet timetable for withdrawal.
205
  
The situation in Afghanistan was unresolved for the Afghans, and as the United States decreased 
aid to the mujahidin who were now fighting amongst themselves for power, disagreements arose 
over the best way to deal with the lawlessness in Kabul.  Congressman Charlie Wilson explicitly 
criticized the American “endgame.”206  Reagan wrote in his diary, “Senator Humphrey thinks 
we’re selling out the Afghans…he’s wrong…we aren’t deserting them.”207  The rising power of 
the warlords in Afghanistan and the lasting effects of the destroyed infrastructure of the country 
undeniably had lasting effects, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  While the situation 
in Afghanistan rapidly deteriorated, so did the relationship between the American and Pakistani 
heads of state. 
When Zia cancelled his trip to Washington, D.C. to meet with Reagan it became apparent 
that the partnership was in rapid decline.  A week later, when Zia declared that Islamic law 
would be the supreme law the land in Pakistan, Reagan wrote, “That puts them into the 
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Fundamentalist Revolution with the Ayotollah & Quadaffi [sic].”208  In the same year, Zia, 
General Akhtar, the United States Ambassador to Pakistan, and a military attaché died in a 
mysterious plane crash.  Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, former director of the Afghan Bureau of 
the ISI, claimed that the plane was sabotaged, most likely by Soviet Union’s covert affairs 
officers with the help of Pakistani military personnel.
209
  He stated that “The US shed some 
crocodile tears over Zia’s death, but the reality was they were not sorry to see him go.”210  He 
cited that the American belief that Zia was fundamentalist, anti-democratic, pro-nuclear, and a 
“liability” contributed to the lack of a thorough investigation of the plane crash.211  With Reagan 
leaving office and Zia dead, 1989 ushered in a new stage of the United States-Pakistan 
relationship, one that continued to decline and will be the topic of discussion in the next chapter.   
The decade from 1979 to 1989 saw several dramatic shifts in the Pakistan-United States 
relationship.  The relationship progressed from a low-point in early 1979 to mutually increased 
interest in each other in December 1979.  The road to friendship was rocky during the Carter 
years, but the remarkable policy shift from “superdoves to superhawks” after the election of 
Reagan laid the foundation for a strong bilateral relationship.
212
  As A. Z. Hilali stated: “On the 
whole, Reagan was more successful than Carter in defending the Gulf and augmenting American 
capabilities to fight against the Soviet Union.
213
   
Pakistan became the third largest recipient of American aid and received a new arsenal of 
weapons such as F-16s, naval destroyers, Cobra Combat helicopters, Stingers, Harpoon missiles, 
and M1A1 Abrams tanks.
214
  Pakistan’s technological capabilities drastically increased from the 
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acquisition of E-2C-Hawkeye AEW, radar defense systems, and reconnaissance aircraft.
215
  The 
relationship projected the greatest strength in the region around 1986, when the Afghan rebels 
started to bring down Soviet helicopters that had previously ruled the skies of Afghanistan.  Yet, 
old problems continued to plague the relationship, specifically the nuclear issue, America’s fear 
of alienating India, and the lack of democracy and rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan.   
In a speech on 7 December 1982, President Reagan told Zia that, although “Differences 
may come between our nations…they proved to be transitory.”216  To some extent this 
symbolizes the Pakistan-United States relationship throughout time.  Yet, the disagreements 
were not really transitory; they were always there.  But sometimes, in times of mutual goals or 
threats, for example the Afghan War, the differences were overlooked.  Eventually, however, the 
mutual goals between the two nations proved transitory.  When the Russians announced their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States no longer saw Pakistan as a “frontline” state that 
they could befriend in the effort to curtail communism.  The United States no longer needed 
Pakistan.  And the same can be said for Pakistan.  The Pakistani army underwent modernization 
and increased power and wealth from the United States during the 1980s.  In the 1990s, the two 
countries’ relationship was severely hindered by the “transitory” issues that had always 
hampered a lasting friendship.  It was not until 11 September 2001 that mutual goals in the 
region turned to a rekindling of the partnership in a combined effort on the Global War on 
Terror.   
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Chapter 3: The Pakistan-United States Relationship from the End of the First Afghan Crisis to 
the Beginning of the Second Afghan Crisis 
The Post-Afghan Crisis Relationship 
In 1988, Afghanistan remained largely lawless and under the control of militant factions 
of former mujahidin.  These groups, led by warlords, vied for control by violent means.  Pakistan 
faced an unresolved situation in Afghanistan, which caused many refugees to remain in Pakistan 
and created general instability in the region.  The crumbling of the Soviet Union and other 
dramatic worldwide events, such as Tiananmen Square and the Palestinian Intifada, distracted 
the superpowers and other leading nations from focusing on the consequences of the Afghan 
crisis on Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Satisfied with the apparently “amicable” Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, Washington and Moscow maintained a “strategic disinterest” in both 
Afghanistan and its Pakistani neighbor. 
 Pakistan and the United States continued to monitor the events unfolding in Afghanistan, 
but the United States failed to take an active role in establishing a stable and legitimate 
government.  In a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Claiborne Pell 
(D-RI) stated that the United States’ interests in Afghanistan were “preeminently 
humanitarian.”217  He explained: “Having supported the Afghan people for ten years it would be 
wrong for us to abandon them now.”218  Yet, both Afghans and Pakistanis felt abandoned by the 
United States.  The perceived American betrayal of Afghanistan in the late 1980s “was only to 
add fuel to the fire of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan.”219  “Now that you no longer need us 
against the Russians in Afghanistan, we have been discarded like a used Kleenex,” was a 
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frequent expression of Pakistani resentment during the 1990s.
220
  Many refugees remained in 
Pakistan, poverty was endemic, and soldiers returned to a harsh reality. 
Even after the Soviet withdrawal, former fighters remained unsettled and many were 
unable to integrate into society as productive and peaceful citizens.  Described as “Kalashnikov 
Culture,” the widespread use of weapons and violence became the dominant source of power in 
the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The emergence of this culture in Pakistan is 
exemplified by the fact that, at one point, one could rent an AK-47 (Kalashnikov) for less than 
two dollars an hour.
221
  Money from Saudi Arabia poured into Pakistan, and former Afghan and 
Arab mujahidin attended madrasas that taught Saudi Arabia’s strict form of Wahhabi Islam.222  
This trend continued to attract anti-Western youth; and by 2003, an estimated 859 madrasas 
were teaching approximately 200,000 young men in Karachi alone.
223
  On a visit to the United 
States in 1989, Benazir Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, warned President George H. W. 
Bush: “I fear we have created a Frankenstein’s monster that will come back to haunt us.”224  By 
1991, Moscow and Washington had ceased sending aid to Afghan militants.
225
  The Pakistan-
United States relationship that had reached its apex during the Afghan crisis began to fracture 
along the same lines as before 1979.   
Problems that had strained the relations between Pakistan and the United States prior to 
the Afghan crisis re-emerged in force by 1990.  Although these troubles were present during the 
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Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, they were not “killer issues.”226  The security threat shared by 
Pakistan and the United States allowed President Reagan and President Zia to overlook 
disagreements about the lack of democratically elected leadership in Pakistan and Pakistan’s 
nuclear proliferation.  The United States was able to export massive amounts of financial and 
military aid despite concerns about nuclear weapons research in Pakistan.  From 1979-1988, the 
United States was not lured into any major Indo-Pakistan conflict, which had historically and 
repetitively been a hindrance to a productive and trusting relationship between Pakistan and the 
United States.  But, in the final decade of the millennium, three issues – democracy, nuclear 
proliferation, and the India factor – combined with the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to define the dimensions of the Pakistan-United States relationship.   
 It is important to look at each of these factors individually.  This will create a focused 
examination of the dominating influences in the relationship.  The first three factors exemplify 
the cyclical, if not redundant, nature of Pakistan-United States relations.  The final factor, the rise 
of fundamentalism, the Taliban, and terrorism, can be traced to the Afghan conflict in which the 
actions of Pakistan, and the United States in particular, led to what Bhutto predicted would return 
to haunt them.  
 
The Impact of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: The Pressler Amendment 
American aid to Pakistan has historically been attached to prerequisites.  For example, 
aid to Pakistan was suspended after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and the embargo was only 
completely dissolved during the Afghan crisis.  In the post-Cold War world, the United States 
adopted a policy of refusing to aid countries with unauthorized possession of nuclear devices.  
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This posed several problems.  The United States had to attempt fairness in dealing with both 
Pakistan and India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  If the United States ended its aid program with 
Pakistan, it would lose influence in Islamabad.  Aid was meant to be an incentive, but Pakistan’s 
armed forces had undergone dramatic modernization and gained strength during the Afghan 
crisis and were not in desperate need of military equipment to the extent that they had been in 
1979.  Pakistani officials were more preoccupied with acquiring nuclear technology to counter 
their rival neighbor, India, even at the cost of losing aid programs from the United States.  The 
United States was rapidly losing influence in Islamabad and American policy toward Pakistan 
was an unbalanced and ineffective mixture of providing aid as incentive or ending aid as 
punishment. 
In 1989, Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, testified before the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs that it would be “counterproductive” to stop assistance to Pakistan based on 
nonproliferation initiatives because the American security commitment and military and 
economic aid were the “most significant means to attain any degree of influence” on Pakistan’s 
nuclear program.
227
  He stated that Pakistan was aware that acquiring a nuclear device would 
constitute the imposition of federal laws terminating aid, but nuclear capabilities development 
continued in Pakistan.
228
  “Post Cold War nonproliferation warriors” focused on Pakistan 
because it was more “visible” than the more clandestine nuclear programs of Iraq, Iran, and 
North Korea.
229
  There had been positive global nonproliferation efforts, such as success in South 
Africa when the country announced that it would halt its nuclear program and when Brazil and 
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Argentina signed a nonproliferation agreement in 1990.
230
  Despite assurances from Pakistan’s 
leading nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan, that Pakistan’s nuclear program was only for “peaceful 
purposes,” the United States Congress enacted the Pressler amendment in 1990.231 
In October 1990, President Bush was unable to guarantee Congress that Pakistan did not 
have a nuclear explosive device.
232
  Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Pressler 
amendment, required all arms sales and even Pakistan’s prior purchases of military equipment to 
end.
233
  A significant consequence of the Pressler amendment was the withholding of seventy-
one F-16 aircraft that Pakistan had ordered in 1989, twenty-eight of which had already been 
purchased.
234
  The United States required Pakistan to pay storage fees for the F-16s, which 
President Bill Clinton described as a “diplomatic insult.”235  During a 1995 visit to the United 
States, Bhutto asked Clinton to either refund the money or deliver the planes.
236
  Clinton replied 
that he would “ask Congress to show some flexibility,” which he did in 1994 by appealing to 
Congress for a one-time exception to the Pressler amendment to release the twenty-eight F-
16s.
237
  Clinton urged Congress to give Pakistan the F-16s.  In exchange, Pakistan would cap its 
fissile production.
238
  Yet, the issue remained unresolved and Pakistan threatened to resort to 
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using courts to make a decision.  By December 1998, the United States paid Pakistan $324.6 
million and another $140 million in commodities such as agricultural goods.
239
  
 The F-16 dispute constituted a major irritant to the Pakistan-United States relationship, 
much as it had during the early years of the Afghan crisis.  The repeated struggle to finalize 
major arms sales is reminiscent of the historically fragile military sales relationship between 
Pakistan and the United States.  Described by the CIA in 1982, that F-16 deal was the 
“yardstick” by which Pakistan measured its trust and friendship with the United States.240   The 
emergence of such a similar disagreement less than ten years later illustrated Congress’s power 
over decisions to sell arms to Pakistan and the negative effect it could have on relations between 
the two nations.  It is also important to note that Clinton actively sought an agreeable solution to 
the problem, which countered the traditional perception in Pakistan that Democrats were “anti-
Pakistan and pro-India.”241 Clinton was also able to sign into law a one-time exception to the 
Pressler amendment in 1996, which allowed the United States to deliver over 300 million dollars 
worth of military hardware Pakistan had ordered prior to 1990.
242
 
Despite the imposition of the Pressler amendment in 1990 and, in effect, the failed F-16 
sale, Pakistan and the United States continued to engage in military cooperation.  During a visit 
to Islamabad in 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry re-established the US-Pakistan 
Consultative Group.
243
  This group had been inactive since the 1990 aid cutoff; but after Perry’s 
visit, the group oversaw “defense cooperation planning, peacekeeping operations, regional 
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security issues, and [the] exchange of intelligence.”244  Although the American and Pakistani 
militaries remained cooperative, America’s policy of suspending aid to Pakistan in 1990 to deter 
its pursuit of nuclear weapons proved a complete failure. 
  India conducted nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998.  Pakistan promptly responded to 
on 28 May with its own explosions.
245
  Nuclear anxieties on the subcontinent immediately 
elevated.  CIA Director James Woolsey testified to Congress that the arms race between Pakistan 
and India posed “perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear weapons,” a statement which supported concerns that a nuclear 
war on the subcontinent was not only possible, but likely.
246
  In a 1999 hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Samuel Brownback (R-KS) questioned the efficacy of 
American policy toward Pakistan. 
The problems we are experiencing today precede Pakistan’s nuclear detonation.  They 
precede Nawaz Sharif’s current government and his previous one as well.  They are, I 
believe, in large part the result of an inconsistent and I believe a failed policy toward 
what was once one of our best friends in South Asia.  You will, I am sure, be pleased to 
hear that I am persuaded that both the administration and the Congress share the blame: 
Congress for sanctioning Pakistan and curtailing our ability to influence Islamabad; the 
administration for, I believe pursuing a one-issue policy since the nuclear test a year and 
a half ago.  Do not mistake what I am saying.  The U.S. rightly strived to have influence 
in an important part of the world.  One of the ways we can do that is by not falling into 
the trap of zero sum politics on the South Asian subcontinent.  What is good for India is 
not bad for Pakistan and what is bad for Pakistan is not good for India.  Each nation in its 
own right deserves a separate foreign policy.  However – and this is a vital caveat – when 
the U.S. treats the same problem in India and Pakistan differently, we create problems for 
ourselves.  Neither nation should be in the nuclear business.  Neither nation should have 
detonated a nuclear device.  And when they did, each deserved the sanctions imposed on 
them by the President.  Looking back, however, I believe we made a mistake in 
threatening and then sanctioning only Pakistan for its development of a nuclear weapon.  
While I understand some of the motivations behind the Pressler amendment, I am 
persuaded that ultimately it had the effect of driving Pakistan to a greater reliance on a 
nuclear deterrent.  It also had the effect of lessening our influence over the Pakistani 
military which, whether we like it or not, is where the real power resides, in Pakistan… 
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The United States has pressured Pakistan not to do any further missile testing, and this is 
an excellent policy.  But was it imperative to beat the Sharif government into this 
submission on this matter in light of India’s continued testing?247 
 
  Brownback’s testimony reflected the controversial nature of providing aid to Pakistan 
based on pre-conditions and expectations.  Throughout the years of the Pakistan-United States 
relationship, American policymakers implemented a conditional and thus unsteady aid policy.  
Some believed that aid was a type of bargaining chip that could be used as either an incentive or 
a punishment.  This is a reactive policy that failed to produce the desired results.  Others, such as 
Senator Brownback, Howard Schaffer, and (earlier) President Ronald Reagan, thought that, 
without an aid program to Pakistan, the United States had minimal influence on Pakistan’s 
policies.  In the past, the United States ended aid programs to Pakistan during its disputes with 
India and over its nuclear program.  Yet, this neither prevented additional Indo-Pakistan conflicts 
nor deterred Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions.  Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto had warned the 
United States in 1974 that, if it could acquire sufficient conventional weapons from the United 
States, it would not need a nuclear weapon to deter India.  But his requests were denied and 
Pakistan developed nuclear weapons capability. Using aid as a tool to shape Pakistan’s policy 
could have been more successful if the United States made firm and unbreakable commitments 
to Pakistan.   
 It is impossible to definitively say that, if the United States had provided Pakistan with 
conventional arms in the 1970s, Pakistan would never have developed a nuclear weapon.  It is 
also difficult to predict the effect importing military equipment to Pakistan would have had on 
the India-United States relationship.  American policymakers found themselves trapped in a 
situation where Pakistan was displeased with American aid to India and vice versa.  If the United 
States had always tilted toward Pakista, and provided aid on a continuous basis, it appeared 
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likely that the Pakistan-United States relationship would have been more stable and amicable.  
But aid from the United States was inconsistent and was always measured against the potential 
impact it would have on the American relationship with India.  From the prospective of using aid 
to buy influence and cooperation, the United States failed to gain a staunch and unwavering ally 
from either country by attempting to be conditional friends with both.  Therefore, the policy of 
using aid as a “club” was ultimately unsuccessful.248  In the future, policymakers should take this 
into account and appeal to Pakistan’s historic desire for what President Zia called an arms sales 
relationship based on “durability and credibility.”249  At times, Pakistani leaders felt they were 
unable to trust America, not only as a steady military sales partner, but also in regard to the India 
situation.  In Brownback’s statement to the Senate committee, he explained that the “The 
Pressler amendment is not the only culprit in the ‘who lost Pakistan’ debate.”250  He was 
specifically referencing American policy toward Pakistan and India regarding the numerous 
Kashmir crises.
251
  
 
Kashmir, Kargil, and Terrorism 
 The incessant conflicts between Pakistan and India regarding Kashmir reignited shortly 
after the first Afghan crisis and posed a grave threat to regional security.  In April 1990, the 
military situation in Kashmir appeared to signal the onset of a third Indo-Pakistan war.  India 
positioned approximately 200,000 troops across from 100,000 Pakistani soldiers, separated by 
the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir.
252
  The Indian and Pakistani troops were engaged in an 
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“eyeball-to-eyeball” staring contest; at times the two armies were only separated by 200 meters 
and the LOC.
253
  American policymakers did not want war to erupt in South Asia because of 
speculation that India and Pakistan were “nuclear-weapon capable.”254  The American policy 
regarding Kashmir had always been that the dispute should be resolved by rapprochement and 
diplomacy, not war, so the White House announced that Robert Gates, the Deputy National 
Security Advisor, would lead a special delegation to Pakistan and India.
255
  From 19-21 May, the 
envoy attempted to “help both sides avoid a conflict over Kashmir” by opening “political 
dialogue” and reducing the tension between Pakistan and India.256 
In Islamabad, Gates explained to President Ghulum Ishaq Khan and Army Chief General 
Aslam Beg, that after war-gaming every scenario, Washington determined that “Pakistan was the 
loser in every scenario” of a war with India.257  Gates made it clear that in the event of a 
Pakistani initiative across the LOC, the United States would end all military support and 
assistance to Pakistan.
258
  Gates also insisted that Pakistan “refrain from supporting terrorism in 
Indian-occupied Kashmir,” and adopt confidence-building measures with India so the current 
crisis would not escalate and future crises could be averted.
259
  Politicians in India received a 
“similar message,” but emphasized that Pakistan’s support for terrorism in the disputed territory 
was “the root cause of the turmoil in Kashmir,” and relations between Pakistan and India “could 
only be normalized after it stopped these activities.”260  Gates informed Indian officials that 
Pakistan agreed to close camps used to train Kashmiri militants, yet Pakistan’s alleged support 
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for terrorism in Kashmir would remain an irritant to Pakistan’s relations with not only India, but 
the United States, in the following years.
261
   
In June, within two weeks of the Gates mission, Indian troops began to withdraw, 
followed by the Pakistani forces.
262
  Some analysts believe that the end of the crisis had more to 
do with the “searing summer heat . . . than any India magnanimity” brought on by the Gates 
mission, while Gates himself thought that his envoy helped avert a conflict by offering a “face-
saving device to stand down.”263  Despite the differing opinions on the effect of the Gates 
mission to India and Pakistan, the 1990 crisis was the first test of American policy in regard to 
Indo-Pakistan rivalry after the Afghan crisis.  As in previous conflicts, such as the 1965 and 1971 
Indo-Pakistan wars, the United States attempted a mostly neutral policy and was unable to affect 
any sort of long-term solution to the Kashmir problem.  Although the crisis was averted, the 
reoccurring conflicts in Kashmir remained unsettled and the United States failed to convince the 
leadership in Pakistan to end support for militants in Kashmir. 
On 9 January 1993, the State Department alerted Pakistan that it was under consideration 
for inclusion on its list of terrorist states due to allegations of state-sponsored support for terrorist 
activities in the Indian states of Kashmir and Punjab.
264
  Although Pakistan was removed from 
the informal watch list in July 1993 for implementing “a policy of ending official support for 
terrorists in India,” a State Department Publication released in April 1995 reported that “there 
were credible reports in 1994; however, of official Pakistani support for Kashmiri militants, 
specifically from Pakistan.”265  Government officials denied giving any other type of assistance 
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than “moral, political, and diplomatic support” to the Kashmiri militants.266  The problem of 
armed militants in Kashmir persisted throughout the 1990s and led Pakistan and India to another 
crisis near the end of the decade. 
In 1999, Muslim militants backed by Pakistan’s army infiltrated and crossed the LOC 
into the Kargil region of Indian Kashmir, engaging Indian forces in guerilla warfare and 
elevating tensions between Pakistan, India, and the United States.
267
  On 4 July 1999, Pakistan’s 
Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, met with President Clinton, to discuss a Pakistani withdrawal.
268
  
Clinton reportedly told Sharif that, if Pakistan withdrew its troops from Kashmir, “the United 
States would express relief without praise,” but if Pakistan did not withdraw “the United States 
would be forced to shift its historic alliance with Pakistan publicly toward India.”269  The 
president claimed that Sharif’s delegation attempted to employ “trick language to suggest that 
Clinton somehow blessed a Pakistani withdrawal . . . or that Pakistan itself did not need to 
withdraw, because the fighters in Kashmir were really mujahidin fighters disguised as 
soldiers.”270  After intense conversation and diplomatic reasoning, Sharif agreed to withdraw, but 
predicted that he would pay a heavy domestic price for the concession.
271
  
Again, the American role in resolving the conflict was important because yet another full-
scale war was prevented through negotiation, but it was only a repetition of the traditionally 
reactionary policy of the United States.  Although the United States had historically advocated 
bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and India, have been unable to resolve their differences 
and come to an agreement on the Kashmir problem.  Thus, the United States has followed a path 
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of “crisis management” in regard to the frequent crises between Pakistan and India.272  The 
Pakistan-India relationship has hinged on the Kashmir problem, and the conflicts of the 1990s 
stemmed largely from the association of the Pakistani government with guerillas who were 
facilitating the perpetual instability and violence in the region.  Not only were American 
policymakers aware of the possibility of fundamentalist activity on Pakistan’s eastern border, 
which they feared could lead to a nuclear war between Pakistan and India, they also had to 
address the rising fundamentalism on Pakistan’s western border. 
Thousands of former mujahidin remained in Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, occupying Peshawar and the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP).
273
  
Analysts suspected that many of the religious schools in the NWFP were actually “fronts for 
terrorist training activities.”274  Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan suffered from an increase in 
violent acts of terrorism.  Pakistan acknowledged the “problems posed by Afghan mujahedin 
[sic] and sympathetic Arabs” in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.275  In 1994, 
Pakistan declined to extend the visas of many of the Arab mujahidin who had remained in 
Pakistan after the conflict, and embarked upon a policy of countering the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism and terrorism in Pakistan.
276
  The government of Pakistan shut down several 
nongovernmental organizations that were suspected of being “cover agencies for Islamic 
militants from the Middle East.”277  Pakistan cooperated with the United States in the effort to 
curb terrorism and instability in Pakistan. 
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assisted Pakistani investigators after the 
murder of two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees in Pakistan in 1993.
278
  After the 
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Pakistani and American officials worked together to 
capture Ramzi Yousef in Islamabad in 1995 and extradite him to the United States.
279
  The 
growing presence of anti-Western and extremist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan worried 
American policymakers.  As American policymakers and analysts became increasingly alarmed 
by the development of radical Islamic individuals and groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, some 
began to associate the problem with American efforts in Pakistan in the 1980s to counter the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.   
The assertion that the CIA’s actions during the Afghan crisis, specifically the channeling 
of weapons through Pakistan into Afghanistan and sparking an anti-Western jihad, is a 
contentious issue.  Peter Bergen, a journalist who has interviewed Osama bin Laden, dismissed 
the idea that the CIA was to blame for the rise of bin Laden because he can find no evidence to 
indicate that the CIA ever gave money to the Arab mujahidin or that members of the CIA had 
ever met with bin Laden or any of his associates.
280
  Members of bin Laden’s inner circle, such 
as Ayman al Zawahiri, attest that the United States never aided the Arab mujahidin.
281
  
According to Bergen, “The notion that bin Laden is a CIA creation, and that the 9/11 attacks 
were some form of ‘blowback’ from the CIA operation during the Afghan jihad is a boilerplate 
analysis among leftists and conspiracy theorists around the world.”282  Michael Moore, a 
filmmaker who subscribes to the idea that the CIA was responsible for launching bin Laden’s 
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rise to terrorism, is an example of a prominent advocate of the ‘blowback’ theory.283  On 12 
September 2001, Moore posted on his website: “WE created the monster known as Osama bin 
Laden!  Where did he go to terrorist school?  At the CIA!”284  Bergen argues that the CIA was 
unaware of bin Laden’s significance until “the bin Laden unit was set up within the CIA in 
January 1996.”285  The United States policy did not fail because it created “terrorist schools” for 
people like bin Laden, it failed in the sense that shortly after the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, warlords and fundamentalists were able to gain control and foster extremism and 
violence which then crossed over the border into Pakistan.   
In Pakistan’s case, militant, Islamic fundamentalism was no longer contained to the 
traditional, regional violence between Pakistan and India, but was rapidly expanding to include a 
global mission of anti-Western, and specifically anti-American, terrorism.  Terrorism in 
Kashmir, whether sponsored by the government of Pakistan or not, has been a consistent and 
persistent factor in Pakistan-Indian relations for decades.  Neither the United States, Pakistan, 
nor India has been able to solve this problem.  This should sound a warning bell for American 
policymakers concerned about terrorism on Pakistan’s western border and in Afghanistan.  The 
anti-Western extremism could prove as persistent as the decades-long militarism in Kashmir.  
The border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan is likely to mirror the unstable and violent 
border region between Pakistan and India. 
 
Supporting Democracy: American Pressure on Pakistan 
The oscillation between democratic leadership and military leadership in Pakistan 
characterizes Pakistan’s political history.  United States policymakers have historically 
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advocated for democratic leadership in Pakistan, which constituted another precondition for 
Pakistan to receive aid from the United States.  For example, the United States Congress 
objected to the sale of F-16s in 1981 based on human rights issues and the state of martial law in 
Pakistan.
286
  
After the Afghan crisis and Zia’s death, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of former Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, was democratically elected as prime minister in 1988, thus breaking 
the trend of dictatorship in Pakistan.
287
  In 1990, President Ishaq Khan dismissed the Bhutto 
government, alleging corruption and failing to sustain law and order in Pakistan.
288
  Nawaz 
Sharif was elected in 1990, but dismissed in 1993.
289
  The cycle repeated throughout the 1990s, 
with Bhutto regaining power after Sharif, only to be dismissed and subsequently replaced by 
Sharif again in 1997.
290
  The “chronic political instability,” combined with widespread 
corruption in the highest levels of the Pakistani Government, added stress to the Pakistan-United 
States relationship.
291
  Democracy during the 1990s ended after Nawaz Sharif lost control of 
Pakistan’s government. 
On 12 October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf displaced Sharif after a military coup.  
Two days later, the United States Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing, entitled 
“Crisis in Pakistan,” to address the “disappoint[ing]” event and its ramifications on aid to 
Pakistan.
292
  The committee met to discuss the possible consequences of the military takeover, 
specifically imposing Section 508 of the 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which 
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called for the cessation of aid programs to countries under military rule.
293
  Assistant Secretary of 
State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, testified: 
 
Pakistan is important.  It is important because it can serve as an example of a progressive 
Islamic democracy . . . It is the history that is repeating itself that gives anyone dealing 
with Pakistan, as we do in the South Asian Bureau, cause to look at that history and say, 
are we seeing signs of its repeating itself?  Again, there has been no democratically 
elected leader to fulfill his or her term in office, and the army has been in control in 
Pakistan for 25 of Pakistan’s 52-year history. 
 
Senator Brownback (R-KS) pointed out that the United States had limited options for 
responding to the “extra-constitutional event.”294  He asked the committee: “What are we going 
to do? Are we going to cutoff aid? Did that.  Give them the cold shoulder?  Did that too.”295  
Brownback suggested that the United States try to re-engage members of the Pakistani military 
by training them in the United States because the military maintained such a significant influence 
on Pakistan’s politics, exemplified by the case of General Musharraf’s accession to power.296  
The Pressler amendment caused the number of Pakistani military leaders trained in the United 
States to decrease from 50 percent to 10 percent, and as a result, American military leaders and 
politicians were unable to develop lasting and positive relationships with potentially powerful 
members of Pakistan’s military.297  Not only had the United States “lost touch with a generation 
of Pakistani military leaders,” but also the military institution was becoming increasingly 
Islamist.
298
  As previously mentioned, the American policy of using aid to persuade Pakistan to 
yield to American expectations failed in regard to nuclear proliferation.  By ending aid to 
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Pakistan in 1990, the United States had nothing left with which to bargain on the collapse of 
democracy in 1999.  
President Clinton publicly responded to the military coup.  During a visit to South Asia in 
2000, although the trip “focused primarily on broadening and deepening ties with India,” Clinton 
also visited Pakistan.
299
  Clinton announced that his stopover in Pakistan did not represent his 
approval or endorsement of the political situation in Pakistan.
300
  The politicians addressed 
various issues, most notably the administration attempted to urge Musharraf to conduct elections 
and return Pakistan to democracy.
301
  In an interview with Taylor Branch, Clinton reportedly 
said: “You’ll notice that Musharraf is saying a lot of nice things about wanting to restore 
democracy,” the president “sighed,” adding “but he never includes any target dates, partners, or 
interim steps.”302  Musharraf failed to hold any elections prior to 11 September 2001, yet, soon 
after the terrorist attacks, the United States resumed aid to Pakistan.  Democracy was no longer a 
primary issue in the Pakistan-United States relationship.  Just as Reagan overlooked martial law 
in Pakistan during the first Afghan crisis, President George W. Bush responded in a similar 
manner.  Sanctions were lifted completely by September 22, 2001 because Bush found “denying 
export licenses and assistance not to be in the national security interests of the United States.”303  
Whether or not the United States ever had a substantial impact on bolstering democracy in 
Pakistan, a larger question loomed: Was the Islamic Republic of Pakistan inherently opposed to 
Western-style democracy? 
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The compatibility, or incompatibility, of Islam with democracy has been a topic of 
interest for decades.  But the subject came under increased scrutiny after the Cold War ended.  In 
Francis Fukuyama’s End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama identified the growing 
consensus of the legitimacy of liberal democracy and its superiority over other forms of 
government such as dictatorships, monarchy, and communism.
304
  He explained that: “Islam has 
indeed defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the Islamic world, posing a grave threat to 
liberal practice even in countries where it has not achieved political power.”305  The general trend 
of autocratic leadership in the Middle East combined with Islamization and other human rights 
practices in Pakistan during Zia’s leadership did not go unnoticed by American policymakers.  
Analyst and political science professor, Hasan-Askari Rizi, and Benazir Bhutto, argued that the 
Islamization in Pakistan was an impediment to strong democratic institutions. 
Some of the results of Zia’s Islamization program represented a shift in government 
policies and laws that did not promote improved human rights conditions and gender equality.  
Some of the effects of Islamization included: the reconstitution of the Council of Islamic 
Ideology to increase the number of orthodox and conservative advisors to the government, the 
intensification of Islamic principles studied at male schools and universities; increased 
censorship, a stricter dress code for women, and punishments that in the West would be 
considered cruel and unusual.
306
  For example, certain crimes were punishable by lashing or 
amputation, and adulterers could be stoned to death.
307
  Women’s rights were restricted; women 
were required to have two witnesses to a crime whereas men only needed one witness.
308
  Also, 
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when obtaining compensation for bodily injury, a woman was only entitled to half of what a man 
would receive for the same crime.
309
  These practices contradicted Bhutto’s idea of a free and 
equal society.  She believed that “gender equality is a prerequisite for democracy to thrive.”310  
As Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto advocated for women’s rights by creating a Ministry of 
Women’s Development, establishing women’s studies programs in universities, appointing 
women to her Cabinet, and initiating a Women’s Development Bank to offer credit to 
“enterprising women.”311  Although, Bhutto believed that Pakistan’s internal political situation 
and the wavering trend of Islamization needed to be addressed, she explained that the West 
needed to re-examine its “caricature” of Islam.312 
Bhutto followed the idea that jihad was an “internal and external struggle to follow the 
just and right path.”313  This contradicts the philosophy of Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a fundamentalist 
Muslim who produced a document entitled: “Defense of the Muslim Land: The First Obligation 
after Imam.”314  According to his teachings, if Muslims are not under attack from on outside 
force, “the fighting becomes fard kafiya [initially compulsory, but voluntary upon fulfillment of 
specific condition] with the minimum requirement of appointing believers to guard borders, and 
the sending of an army at least once a year to terrorize the enemies of Islam.”315  The actual 
meaning of jihad is a term open to a variety of interpretations.  Bhutto did not advocate yearly 
raiding parties, but some Muslims maintain a stricter interpretation of the Quran.  Bhutto 
conceded: 
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If jihad is indeed about offensive war against other religions and Muslim sects, then 
surely Muslims will have trouble living in a democratic world, let alone forming their 
own functioning, pluralistic democracies.  If this is the case, then my thesis – that 
democracy and Islam are not only compatible but mutually sustaining – will fail.316 
 
Bhutto’s portrayal of Islam and democracy as compatible was based on her interpretation 
of the Quran which “empowers the people with rights (democracy) demanding consultation 
between rulers and ruled (parliament) and requiring the leaders serve the interests of the people 
or be replaced by them (accountability).”317  Bhutto argued that for democracy to flourish in 
Islamic countries, the West needs to be actively engaged in supporting democratic movements.  
One way to do this is to acknowledge “the residual damage of colonialism and its support for 
dictatorships during the Cold War.”318  According to Bhutto, the interests of the West focused 
primarily on securing access to oil or containing communism.
319
   
A prime example of the United States cooperating with a non-democratically elected 
leader was during the Afghan crisis when Reagan and Zia formed a strong partnership.  She adds 
that the alleged disparity between Islam and democracy is “used to divert attention from the sad 
history of Western political intervention in the Muslim world.”320  Another manifestation of this 
type of American policy was, until recently, the American support for Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.  
Egypt was the second largest recipient of aid from the United States, and the Egyptian and 
American armies cooperated during the Persian Gulf War.  Nevertheless, in nearly thirty years in 
power, Mubarak failed to hold fair elections.  There is now a general concern in the United 
States that the new leading factions of the government, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, 
will make the Egypt-United States relationship more fragile if Egypt follows a path of 
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extremism, which could lead to instability in the region.  This supports the theory that American 
leaders prefer to develop relationships with stable leaders and groups that are not explicitly anti-
Western.  American leaders propping up dictators in Pakistan is also shown in the case of 
Musharraf.  
President Bush stated that the “Musharraf coup is going to bring stability to the region 
and I think that good news for the subcontinent.”321  Bush’s statement is actually ironic because 
Musharraf played an active role in the Kargil conflict and used Sharif’s withdrawal from the 
disputed territory as grounds for overthrowing him.  Yet, it was easier for America to work with 
a moderate and powerful head of state with ties to the military than a weak civilian government 
or a radically Islamist leader, as is the case in the current Iran-United States relationship.  This is 
the especially the case after 11 September 2001. 
Bhutto asserted that the United States “makes human rights the centerpiece of its foreign 
policy selectively.”322  She called attention to a section of Bush’s second inaugural address: 
We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our 
relations will require the decent treatment of their own people.  America’s belief in 
human dignity will guide our policies, yet rights must be more than the grudging 
concessions of dictators; they are secured by free dissent and the participation of the 
governed.  In the long run, there is no justice without freedom, and there can be no 
human rights without human liberty.
323
 
 
Although this served as a warning, it was benign in the case of Pakistan.  Bush’s stand against 
rulers like Musharraf contradicted the reality of the deep partnership between Pakistan and the 
United States during the second Afghan crisis.  It was also reminiscent of the Reagan-Zia 
partnership during the first Afghan crisis.  The American attitude toward autocratic rulers in 
Pakistan during times of crisis and when the United States needed Pakistan as a strategic ally in 
                                                 
321
 Stanley Renshon and Deborah Lawson, Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 72.  
322
 Bhutto, Reconciliation, 83. 
323
 Bhutto, Reconciliation, 83. 
  
73 
 
the region represents a contrasting image to the American policy of condemnation and aid cut-
offs to Pakistan when the United States is not drawn into an Afghan crisis.  This is a pattern in 
the Pakistan-United States relationship. 
 
 
11 September 2001: The Second Afghan Crisis 
Prior to 11 September 2001, Pakistan was “the most public defender of the Taliban,” the 
militant group that had gained control of Afghanistan during the 1990s.
324
  Pakistan, along with 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, were the only three countries to recognize the 
Taliban as the official and legitimate government of Pakistan.
325
  Throughout Pakistan’s history, 
leaders in the country had always desired a strong central Afghan government with which they 
could form a friendly relationship and thus give them strategic-depth against India.  Musharraf 
explained that Pakistan had supported the Taliban for “geostrategic reasons . . . if we had broken 
with them, that would have created a new enemy on our western border, or a vacuum of 
power.”326  Leaders in Pakistan were concerned that if the Taliban lost power, members of the 
Northern Alliance, which contained “anti-Pakistan elements,” would lead to a contentious 
Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship.
327
  Members of the Taliban also had “strong ethnic and family 
linkages” with members of Pakistan’s government.328  As the Taliban exerted control in 
Afghanistan, they allowed Osama bin Laden and his organization, al-Qaida, a group which 
publically called for attacks against the United States and was responsible for the 1998 bombings 
of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, to establish a base of operations in Afghanistan. 
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Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan in 1996 and formed a partnership with Mullah 
Omar, the head of the Taliban.
329
  The leader of al-Qaida was allowed to open training camps in 
Kandahar and the Taliban “seemed to open the doors to all who wanted to come to Afghanistan 
to train in the camps.”330  In The 9/11 Commission Report, The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States speculated that Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s 
move to Pakistan and military intelligence officers may have assisted his entrance into 
Afghanistan.
331
  The commission also had reason to believe that Pakistani intelligence officers 
had introduced bin Laden to high-ranking Taliban leaders in an effort to help bin Laden gain 
control of training camps that could have been used to train militants operating in Kashmir.
332
 
On 19 December 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1333, 
spearheaded by the United States and Russia, to “drive a wedge  between the Taliban and 
Pakistan” by encouraging Pakistan to stop providing military advice and aid to the Taliban.333  
Although Pakistan did not end its military assistance to the Taliban, it did decrease the size of the 
Taliban’s staff in Pakistan’s embassy.334  In the follow-up Resolution 1363, approved 30 July 
2001, Pakistani leaders agreed to allow the United Nations to establish border monitors to 
guarantee that military equipment was not filtering into Afghanistan from Pakistan.
335
  Pakistan’s 
“tentative steps” toward cooperation demonstrated an “increasing wariness that the Taliban 
movement was radicalizing existing Islamic movements in Pakistan.”336  Leaders in Pakistan 
also worried that by providing aid to Afghanistan, the United States would turn away from 
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Pakistan and instead embrace India as a regional ally against extremism.
337
  The events on 11 
September 2001 signaled the imminent collapse of the friendly relations between the Taliban and 
Pakistan. 
Musharraf claimed that, on 12 September, Secretary of State Colin Powell called him 
with an ultimatum: “You are either with us or against us.”338  Musharraf also claimed that the 
Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, threatened the Director General of the Inter 
Services Intelligence Committee, General Mahmud Ahmad, saying: “We had to decide whether 
we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be 
prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.”339  Later, President George Bush, Armitage, and 
Ahmad denied that the inflammatory statement was ever made.
340
  Tariq Ali, who was born and 
educated in Pakistan and has written several studies on Pakistan, questions whether Musharraf 
may have lied about the threat.
341
  Ali raises the possibility that Musharraf “exaggerated to 
impress his corps commanders that there was no option but to do Washington’s bidding,” and 
asks whether it could have merely been a “ploy to increase sales of his book.”342  Either way, 
Pakistan quickly responded that it was on the side of the United States. 
In a meeting on 13 September between Armitage, Ahmad, and Pakistan’s ambassador to 
the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, the United States proposed seven conditions, or demands, to 
Pakistan that would form the basis of the early crisis partnership.  They were: 
 to stop al-Qaida operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Laden; 
 to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military 
and intelligence operations; 
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 to provide territorial access to U.S and allied military intelligence and other personal  to 
conduct operations against al-Qaida; 
 to provide the United States with intelligence information; 
 to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts; 
 to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; 
and 
 if the evidence implicated bin Laden and al-Qaida and the Taliban continued to harbor 
them, to break relations with the Taliban government.
343
 
 
Ali stated that: “Without even looking closely at the printed sheet, Mahmud Ahmad put it in 
his pocket and said that he accepted everything.”344  According to Ali’s sources, Armitage was 
taken aback and asked Ahmad if he needed to consult with Musharraf first, especially since some 
of the requests were related to Pakistan’s sovereignty.345  The same day, in a National Security 
Council meeting, Colin Powell announced that “Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for 
support in the war on terrorism.”346  But this does not correlate with Musharraf’s account of the 
diplomatic encounters.  
In Musharraf’s book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, he claimed that some of the demands 
were “ludicrous.”347  For example, Musharraf explained that the fifth demand depended “on the 
interpretation of what constitutes verbal support for terrorism.”348  He thought that the statement 
“should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida . . . self-contradictory” 
because the United States could not be sure at such an early time who was responsible for the 
attacks.
349
  In his memoir, Musharraf asserted that he never agreed to the second or third demand 
because granting the United States total access to its naval ports and fighter aircraft bases would 
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jeopardize Pakistan’s “strategic assets.”350  He stated that he only agreed to give the United 
States permission to use two bases, far from “sensitive areas,” that could only be used for 
logistics and aircraft recovery, not offensive operations.
351
  According to Musharraf, “The rest of 
the demands we could live with.”352  He was “happy” that the United States accepted his 
adaptations to the demands “without any fuss.”353  Musharraf was “shocked” at the assertion that 
he accepted the demands completely and without any adjustments. 
Yet, on 13 September, the embassy in Islamabad confirmed Pakistan’s acceptance of the 
seven demands but explained that the use of Pakistani airspace and other “substantial 
concessions” would mean that the government of Pakistan, specifically Musharraf, would have 
to pay a “domestic price.”354  The 9/11 Commission Report makes no mention of any 
disagreements over the seven conditions.  A Congressional Research Service report, 
“Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” noted that Pakistan had indeed 
conceded access to airfields, airspace, and ports.
355
  The differing accounts of the actual 
diplomatic communications and the willingness of Pakistan to comply with every measure of the 
list of demands may never be completely explained.  It does seem likely, however, that 
Musharraf’s interpretation of events as explained in his book were skewed, and intended to 
dispel any notion that he had easily submitted to the United States.  Despite the lingering lack of 
clarity on the negotiations between Pakistan and the United States in the days after 11 
September, Pakistan accepted the role of partner to the United States, and benefited from it.   
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By cooperating with the United States, Pakistan was also able to avoid a strengthening of 
India-United States relations, especially after India offered its bases to the United States.
356
  Not 
only did the United States waive its sanctions on Pakistan, it also began sending significant 
amounts of aid, which as of 15 November 2001 was predicted to reach one billion dollars.
357
  In 
exchange for financial assistance from the United States, Pakistan was expected to try to 
negotiate the extradition of Osama bin Laden.  Musharraf “initiated a dialogue [with Mullah 
Omar and the Taliban] immediately” to avoid “the wrath of the United States.”358  Allegedly, 
Mullah Omar did not express sympathy for the attacks, but rather dismissed the attacks as 
“God’s punishment for the injustices against Muslims.”359  Osama bin Laden remained at large 
for nearly ten years until he was found in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011.  
 The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 represent the beginning of the second Afghan 
crisis.  Unlike the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the United States was under direct 
attack, but the reaction of American policymakers was strikingly similar to the American 
response in 1979.  American leaders immediately reached out to Pakistan to address the problem 
in Afghanistan as it had thirty years earlier.  Pakistan served as the most convenient route into 
landlocked Afghanistan and Pakistan’s connection with the Taliban and other leaders in 
Afghanistan made Pakistan a valuable ally.  The United States immediately saw Pakistan as a 
partner again, not against communism, but against al-Qaida and terrorism.  The United States 
benefitted from its partnership with Pakistan by its ability to plan and conduct its operations from 
Pakistan.  Pakistan benefited from its renewed aid program with the United States.  As the years 
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progressed, the Pakistan-United States relationship again deteriorated, continuing another 
cyclical pattern of oscillation between high and low points in the relationship.   
 
Conclusion 
Pakistan occupies an important geopolitical position because of its proximity to the 
Persian Gulf.  During the Cold War, access to oil from the gulf was a high priority for American 
policymakers, as illustrated by the Carter Doctrine.  Not only was Pakistan’s location near the 
“oil jugular of the West” an incentive for American diplomats to reach out to Pakistan, but 
because it bordered Afghanistan, Pakistan played a deciding role in both the first and second 
Afghan crises.
360
  Zbigniew Brzezinski characterized the combination of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan as “geopolitical linchpin” states.361  He explained that “a linchpin state is one that is 
both intrinsically important and in some sense ‘up for grabs.’”362  The area comprising Pakistan 
and Afghanistan was important during the Cold War; both the Soviet Union and the United 
States grappled for influence.  While Pakistan was geopolitically valuable, it suffered from a 
significant security threat from its archrival, India, and its strained relations with the government 
of Afghanistan.  Pakistan needed military equipment to counter its security threat, which the 
United States often accommodated throughout the Pakistan-United States relationship. Yet, 
geopolitical considerations were not enough to constitute a steady relationship between Pakistan 
and the United States.  
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Stephen Cohen, an expert on Pakistan, has described the Pakistan-United States 
relationship as “episodic and discontinuous.”363  The cyclical nature of the bilateral relationship 
began in the 1950s, when Pakistan became “America’s most allied ally in Asia.”364  The close 
alliance between Pakistan and the United States, bolstered by memberships in SEATO, the 
Mutual Security Act of 1954, and the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation, was not permanent.  The 
relationship declined during the 1960s after the 1962 Indo-China War, when the United States 
sent aid to India, and after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.  The fluctuation prior to the first Afghan 
crisis reflected the nature of American Cold War policy and the struggle to balance global 
interests with that of its regional partners.  The vacillation also appeared to stem from the 
different policies of Democrats and Republicans in American politics, as well as struggles over 
control of those policies by the Executive and Legislative Branches.  
As discussed earlier, there is a general notion in Pakistan that Republican administrations 
were friendlier toward Pakistan than Democratic administrations.  Historians agree that during 
the Afghan crisis, the Republican president, Ronald Reagan, was “more successful than Carter in 
defending the Gulf.”365  Whereas Democratic president Jimmy Carter focused on nuclear 
proliferation and arms restraint, Reagan successfully reignited the Pakistan-United States 
relationship by overlooking Pakistan’s nuclear activities and sending the country millions of 
dollars in military and economic aid to confront the Russian presence in Afghanistan.  Reagan 
was markedly more aggressive.  While the distinction between Republican and Democratic 
leadership is clear during the Afghan crisis, there is a lack of scholarship on the pre and post 
crisis periods.   
                                                 
363
 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 304. 
364
 “228 Address by Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan to US, at the Naval War College, New Port, 
Rhode Island, 14 May 1963 (Extracts),” K. Arif, ed., in America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2 (Lahore, Pakistan: 
Vanguard Books, 1984), 221. 
365
 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 5. 
  
81 
 
The Republican tendency to advocate a closer military relationship and broader arms 
sales arrangements, and the Democratic pattern of stressing nonproliferation and democracy in 
Pakistan, appears to be an assumption in scholarship that is never fully addressed.  This field of 
study could greatly benefit from an in-depth analysis of the key political players and the extent to 
which the American political system affected the “episodic” nature of the Pakistan-United States 
relationship.  Identifying patterns in the relationship would not only contribute to the study of the 
past but could reveal clues about the future of the relationship. 
Another deficit in the scholarship, which this thesis attempts to fill, is the lack of any 
endeavor to explicitly identify the peak and valley of the relationship by year.  This thesis 
quantifies the high and low point of the relationship, and in effect, reveals that the low point 
came immediately prior to the galvanizing event of the first Afghan crisis and the highest point 
was in 1986, during the crisis.  In 1979, the Pakistan-United States relationship suffered from 
arms and aid embargos, Pakistan’s withdrawal from CENTO, and strained relations between 
Pakistani and American leadership.  Yet, within seven years the relationship rebounded due to 
several factors: a strong relationship between Reagan and Pakistan’s President Zia al-Haq, 
Congressional approval of a six-year aid program to Pakistan of over four billion dollars, and 
success in Afghanistan.   
That the apex of the Pakistan-United States relationship came during a crisis period is 
revealing.  Pakistan and the United States maintain stronger relationships during times of crisis, 
specifically the first and second Afghan crises.  The peak of the relationship also occurred after 
American policymakers offered the government of Pakistan a long-term and significant aid 
package.  Zia rejected Carter’s 1980 proposal of 400 million dollars over two years because he 
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perceived it as “devoid of credibility and durability.”366  The key to achieving a strong bilateral 
relationship with Pakistan relied on the willingness of American politicians to offer substantial 
aid to Pakistan.  This was true during the first Afghan crisis and also constitutes a major sealant 
to the current Pakistan-United States relationship.  During times of crisis, Pakistan responds best 
to generous aid packages.   
In 1986, India and nuclear proliferation were virtually non-issues.  Pakistan’s historic 
rivalry with India, the subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971, and the nuclear arms race on the 
subcontinent, constituted the most harmful aspects to the Pakistan-United States relationship.  
But in 1986, these issues were overlooked.  As Zia told Reagan in 1982, the differences that 
come between Pakistan and the United States “proved to be transitory.”367  Before and after the 
crisis, the Indo-Pakistan relationship and nuclear programs of both countries had dramatic effects 
on the Pakistan-United States relationship.  Both in 1977 and 1990, the United States ceased 
sending military aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear program.  But during the first Afghan 
crisis, and to a degree the second Afghan crisis, these issues have been set aside, allowing the 
two countries to cooperate on achieving mutual goals.  If this pattern continues, it can be 
expected that after the United States ends its combat mission in Afghanistan, the same issues will 
re-emerge, probably damaging the relationship to the extent that the United States will limit or 
end its aid program to Pakistan.   
Historically, the provision of aid has served as the greatest factor affecting the Pakistan-
United States relationship.  Whether or not the United States was sending aid to Pakistan 
indicated the strength, or weakness, of relations between the countries.  Throughout the past 
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decades, American aid has been attached to requirements, specifically to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program, lack of democracy, and conflicts with India.  The United States government imposed 
the Pressler amendment in 1990, thus ending its aid program and contributing to a feeling of 
abandonment in Pakistan.  Engrained in American policy toward Pakistan is the notion that using 
aid as positive or negative reinforcement is the best way to control Pakistan and make the 
country conform to American wishes of nuclear nonproliferation and democratic leadership.  But 
this is largely a reactive policy that has ultimately been unsuccessful.  The Pressler amendment 
did not stop Pakistan from pursuing nuclear technology.  And in 1999, when Pervez Musharraf 
overthrew Nawaz Sharif, the United States had negligible influence in Pakistan because the 
relationship was already strained from the consequences of the Pressler amendment.  Making aid 
conditional has ultimately decreased the amount of influence the United States has on Pakistan.  
In Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan, Robert McMahon noticed 
that President Lyndon Johnson’s “heavy-handed attempts to resolve” the India-Pakistan 
“conundrum by using U.S. aid as a club just intensified the core problems.”368  A feeling of 
distrust followed the suspension of American aid during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and was 
repeated several times throughout the Pakistan-United States relationship.  In the late 1970s, 
Pakistan felt threatened by India’s nuclear program and requested conventional arms, which the 
United States denied.  After 1990, as the situation in Afghanistan remained largely unresolved, 
the United States ceased sending large amounts of military and economic aid.   
American policymakers had reasons to end aid to Pakistan based on their expectations of 
the country, but Pakistanis nevertheless felt betrayed.  The credible and durable arm sales 
relationship that Pakistan had always wanted from the United States was never stable.  In effect, 
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this contributed to the transient friendship between the two countries.  Members of both 
governments know that the relationship has been strained; but, if the United States had been an 
unconditional friend of Pakistan, the relationship would be stronger and more amicable.  Yet, 
some analysts still believe that the United States should only give aid to Pakistan if the country 
complies with American expectations. 
Stephen Krasner, an international relations analyst, wrote a piece for Foreign Affairs 
entitled: “Talking Tough to Pakistan: How to End Islamabad’s Defiance.”  Published in the first 
issue of 2012, this article is specifically in response to the currently frustrating relations between 
Pakistan and the United States.  Yet the question at hand has been the same for decades: how 
should the United States implement its policy of aid to Pakistan?  In combination with recent 
reports of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) funding the terrorist group the Haqqani 
network, or the outrage in Pakistan and the United States after the raid on Osama bin Laden’s 
compound, Krasner also claimed the Pakistan has been the “world’s worst nuclear 
proliferator.”369  He suggested that the United States take a markedly more aggressive approach 
to its policy toward Pakistan, because “the only way the United States can get what it actually 
wants from Pakistan is to make credible threats to retaliate if Pakistan does not comply with U.S. 
demands.”370  He stated that: “The United States has shown that the sticks that come with its 
carrots are hollow.”371  The idea that using harsh and inflammatory language toward an ally and 
bullying Pakistan into compliancy as Krasner suggests, is a fallacy.   
Pakistan had never responded positively to American demands because Pakistani leaders 
have differing goals and regional problems than the United States.  To think that Pakistan would 
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end its nuclear program years ago, or allow any foreign power to hamper its nuclear weapons 
now, is naïve.  Pakistanis have always been most concerned with regional threats, mostly from 
India, but from Afghanistan as well.  The government of Pakistan’s friendship with the Taliban, 
frowned upon by Americans, was simply a continuation of its India strategy.  If Pakistan could 
maintain friendly relations with leaders in Afghanistan it would have one more advantage over 
India.  For American analysts, politicians, and policymakers to think Pakistanis would act in the 
interests of the United States rather than its own best interests is an issue that needs to be 
addressed, and hopefully eliminated.  It is too late now to change history and undo the deeds that 
caused mutual distrust, and if American policymakers continue to enact realpolitik policies 
against Pakistan, they can only expect to harm the future of Pakistan-United States relations.   
The second most influential, and damaging, issue between Pakistan and the United States 
emanates from the India-Pakistan rivalry.  While scholars and politicians agree that 
rapprochement would be in India and Pakistan’s best interest, the general consensus is that 
bilateralism, multilateralism, or negotiations led by the United Nations is unlikely.
372
 In a hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January 2004, Cohen testified that one of 
the “lessons learned” from the history of India-Pakistan relations was “India and Pakistan can 
reach agreement on ancillary issues, including confidence building measures, but not on 
Kashmir’s final status.”373  American politicians and diplomats have failed to remain impartial or 
solve the problem.   
The American response to the numerous conflicts has always been reactionary because, 
as most historians agree, the Indian-Pakistan rivalry is persistent and the prospect for resolution 
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is unhopeful, and American policy cannot change that.  Robert Wirsing, an expert in 
international relations, specifically Pakistan-United States relations, explained that “managing 
the Kashmir dispute — not resolving it — is, of course, what India and Pakistan have been doing 
all along.”374  The United States has attempted to help resolve the conflict, perhaps most notably 
in the 1999 meeting between Nawaz Sharif and President Bill Clinton.  But American diplomats 
cannot directly mediate because not only does India refuse, but American-led mediation would 
be “impractical” since the United States is viewed as an “indifferent and unreliable” player in 
South Asian politics.
375
   
Wirsing accurately summarized American Cold War policy in regard to managing the 
security of the subcontinent as “essentially derivative of other objectives, and thus limited or 
transient.”376  During the Cold War, the United States was more concerned about containing 
communism from China and the Soviet Union than resolving a bitter dispute between India and 
Pakistan.  Wirsing wrote in 1990: “There is very little reason to believe that the United States, 
freed from the problem of Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, will now make a strong bid 
to resolve the Kashmir dispute.”377 The same prediction can be applied to the current American 
“problem” in Afghanistan.  A popular trend in the study of Pakistan-United States relations, 
asking “what if?” has led scholars to question what policies the United States could have 
followed to avert entanglement in the India-Pakistan quagmire.   
McMahon has identified two policies that might have been more effective than the poorly 
executed balancing act of American policy toward the subcontinent during the Cold War.  He 
states that if American policymakers desired a cooperative relationship with a regional power in 
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South Asia, an alliance with India rather than Pakistan would have made “eminent sense.”378  A 
relationship with a militarily and economically superior India, a country which exercised 
“greater international prestige and influence,” would have been more natural than the Pakistan-
United States relationship.
379
  Another policy option for the United States could have been 
“careful evenhandedness, which eschewed formal political or security ties” with both 
countries.
380
  McMahon asserted that “strict impartiality would have carried far fewer risks.”381  
He specifically referred to the regional arms race that erupted when American policymakers 
attempted to make both India and Pakistan Cold War partners.
382
  Although it is useful to 
question the past in the search for a better future, it must be done either thoroughly or not at all.   
McMahon’s arguments are logical, but he failed to extend the consequences of his 
hypothetical history to the situation in Afghanistan.  He should have explained what effect his 
preferred methods of American policy would have had on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.  
Would the United State not have been involved in Afghanistan if it had chosen India as a 
regional ally instead of Pakistan?  If America had followed a path of “strict impartiality” would 
the American effort to expel Russian troops from Afghanistan with the cooperation of Pakistan 
been impossible?  In any consideration of Pakistan-United States relations, the Afghan crisis 
must be taken into account because of its deep impact on history.   
So what can history suggest about the future of India-Pakistan-United States relations? If 
history is any indicator, the United States will continue to attempt friendly bilateral relations with 
both Pakistan and India while trying to avoid alienating either.  In the past two Afghan crises, 
Pakistan was willing to serve as the United States’ gateway into Afghanistan, especially after the 
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lowest point in the Pakistan-United States relationship in 1979 and the tense relationship 
between the two in 2001.  India is a rising power that the United States wants to trade with and 
have as a partner in the Indian Ocean region.  Remarks from Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs on 24 April 2012 revealed that if the United States was going to 
embark on a mission to pursue a stronger bilateral relationship with India, even to the detriment 
of its relationship with Pakistan, now may be the time.  As the war winds down in Afghanistan, 
and the United States becomes less dependent on Pakistan to fight the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), Shapiro highlighted some facts that indicate an increasingly “robust relationship based 
on security interests.”383  He stated that: 
Since the signing of a bilateral defense framework agreement in 2005, our [the Indian and 
American] defense relationship has become a major pillar of the strategic partnership.  
For example: 
 India now holds more than 50 annual military exercises with the United States, 
more than any other country. 
 Cumulative defense sales have grown from virtually zero to more than $8 billion. 
 And high-level exchanges on defense issues also have increased…384 
Even though prospects for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute appear unrealistic, a strong and 
mutually beneficial India-United States relationship will extend into the future, whether 
Pakistanis approve or not.   
 The effects of American policy toward Pakistan expanded dramatically after 11 
September 2001.  Pakistan re-emerged as America’s ally in confronting another Afghan crisis, 
this time against terrorism rather than communism.  After 2001, the field of scholarship started 
analyzing the first Afghan crisis to reveal clues about the second.  Most studies raise the 
question: What went wrong?  The answer, from both South Asian and American scholars, 
typically blames American foreign policy for failing to make a long term commitment to the 
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stability of Afghanistan after the Russian withdrawal, which, in turn, led to instability and a 
feeling of abandonment in Pakistan.   
 According to Hassan Abbas, author of Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, 
and America’s War on Terror, “the onset of the Afghan war was the most fateful dagger driven 
into the heart of Pakistan.”385  He asserted that Pakistan partnered with the United States during 
the first Afghan crisis only to face the consequences by itself.  He explained that “Pakistan had 
helped America sow the wind in Afghanistan, but when the time came to reap the whirlwind, it 
had to do it alone.”386  Abbas is only one of many to criticize the way American policymakers 
handled the end of the first Afghan crisis. 
Mohammed Yousef, co-author of Afghanistan-The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a 
Superpower, served in the ISI as the head of the Afghan Bureau from 1983 to 1987.  His 
firsthand experience during the Afghan crisis left him with a distinct impression of frustration 
and anger toward American policy of the late 1980s.  He argued that “it was the deliberate policy 
of the US government that we should never achieve a military victory in Afghanistan.”387  In his 
opinion, the United States military had “avenged Vietnam” and brought about a stalemate that 
would bring nothing but chaos and instability to Afghanistan.
388
  At that time, American 
policymakers were unaware that by leaving Afghanistan in the hands of warlords, they were 
laying the foundation for a future terrorist state.   
The efforts of the post-11 September 2001 studies have succeeded in highlighting the 
consequences of abandoning Afghanistan.  Dan Feldman, the Deputy Special Representative for 
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Pakistan and Afghanistan testified to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle 
East and South Asia that: “We have learned the lessons of history and are committed to avoiding 
the kind of precipitous pullout that can fuel instability, as was the case in the early 1990s.”389  
The United States will undoubtedly remain committed to Afghanistan even after 2014, but a 
similar commitment to Pakistan is less likely.  
Another scholar of the Pakistan-United States relationship, A. Z. Hilali, argued that “the 
United States . . . took advantage of Pakistan’s desperate need for military and economic 
assistance.”390  Because Pakistan was the weaker partner in the relationship, its interests were 
“sacrificed” so that the interests of the stronger partner would prevail.391  While Hilali was 
correct, the United States was the dominant partner in the Pakistan-United States relationship, he 
failed to see the importance of the benefits Pakistan received from their relationship with the 
United States.  Historically, Pakistani leaders have sought to bolster its military to deter and 
protect themselves from India.  The danger of the Moscow-New Delhi Line (and after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, the Moscow-Kabul line) threatened to engulf Pakistan in a “strategic 
vise.”392  Pakistan was a frail nation that overnight became a vulnerable ‘‘frontline state,’’ 
making Pakistani officials eager for American assistance and aid.  The American arms sales 
relationship with Pakistan helped strengthen its military force, arguably one of Pakistan’s most 
vital interests.  Yet, fulfilling some of Pakistan’s interests damaged the prospects of others.   
Abbas declared that by strengthening Pakistan’s military, “America lost the forest for the 
trees.”393  Sponsoring Pakistan’s army “meant the concomitant impoverishment of the country 
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and the emasculation of the nascent political process.”394 As illustrated during both Afghan 
crises, the United States formed working relationships with non-democratically elected leaders, 
despite previous condemnations.  The American desires for a strong executive leadership in 
Pakistan, and a forceful Pakistani military to cooperate with during times of crisis, appear 
incongruous.  “As the army grew in strength” from aid from the United States, “it frequently 
took over the task of governance.”395  American policy has frequently been caught in a “Catch-
22” in regard to Pakistan.  Any action American policymakers took often had a negative 
reaction, which is exemplified by the case of balancing military strength and partnership in 
Pakistan with support for democratically-chosen presidents.  The United States has to carefully 
consider the implications of its policies toward Pakistan and attempt to weigh the pros against 
the cons.  
 Scholars do not hesitate to put forth recommendations for how the United States can 
“fix” the Pakistan problem.  These range from further economic support and funding for secular 
education to further insistence on democratic institutions and rapprochement with India.  Abbas, 
Hilali, Ali, and Cohen agreed that continuing economic aid would have a positive effect on 
stabilizing Pakistan.  Ali wrote that “to permanently continue as a satrapy is certainly not going 
to help Pakistan.”396  American economic assistance should extend to education.  Abbas urged 
American policymakers to “realize that it cannot bomb an idea out of existence.”397  Instead the 
United States should provide economic opportunity as an alternative to fundamentalism.  Usama 
Butt, a security analyst and Pakistan-United States scholar, recommended that while the United 
States should continue to advocate democracy in Pakistan, it should not expect Pakistan to adopt 
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a Western model of democracy characterized by secularism, consumerism, or liberalism.
398
  
Finally, the United States should remain focused on “facilitati[ng]” an end to the Kashmir 
conflict in any and every way possible.
399
 
 All of these suggestions are worth considering, but American and Pakistani leaders 
should not be overly optimistic about the success of any of them.  Cohen asserts that “there is no 
magic bullet theory, and the United States must balance competing interests, take account of the 
long and the short run, and recognize the difficulty of fostering change in another state’s 
fundamental institutions, all the while preparing for worst-case futures.”400  Krasner, who calls 
for a stricter policy of conditional aid, lamented that although American officials “recognize the 
flaws in their country’s current approach to Pakistan . . . instead of making radical changes to 
that policy, Washington continues to muddle through.”401 Perhaps muddling through is exactly 
what American policymakers want to do.  Throughout the Pakistan-United States relationship, 
the United States has been most interested in Pakistan during times of crisis. As the war in 
Afghanistan reaches its end, the Pakistan-United States relationship is reminiscent of the last 
years of the first Afghan crisis.  Pakistanis worry about being abandoned next to a hostile and 
unstable neighbor as they perceived they were in 1988.  The United States is apprehensive about 
maintaining an aid relationship with a country with a significant number of active extremists and 
one that is governed by a fragile and allegedly corrupt government that is in many ways 
influenced by the military.  
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The United States and Pakistan are once again at a crossroads, and if history is any indicator, 
the Pakistan-United States relationship will enter a cooling-off stage.  It can be expected that 
after the United States leaves Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan will have strained 
relations on the issues of fundamentalism, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, India-
Pakistan relations, and the precarious nature of the civilian government.  Perhaps the most 
revealing statement on the relationship between Pakistan and the United States during the second 
Afghan crisis was Musharraf’s advice to Hugo Chavez at the Non-Aligned Conference in 
Havana, Cuba, on 11 September 2006: “You are far too aggressive with the United States.  Do as 
I do.  Accept what they say and then do as you want.”402  Pakistani leaders are well aware that 
after the Afghan crisis, the United States could soon return to its “historic default option: 
ignoring Pakistan.”403 
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